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“PROCEDURAL SWIFT”: COMPLEX LITIGATION 
REFORM, STATE TORT LAW, AND DEMOCRATIC 
VALUES 
JoEllen Lind* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Increasingly, the judicial power of the federal courts is being 
deployed to limit state tort law1 in violation of the spirit, if not the letter, 
of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.2  This phenomenon intersects vitally 
with the phenomenon of complex litigation, for calls to address the 
problems of complexity are being commandeered to reshape state 
substantive law.  The technique for achieving this result is to exploit the 
power of the national government to regulate procedure in diversity 
cases.  Through recent legislation, amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (“FRCP”), and judge-made procedural principles, the 
federal courts offer an ever-more-enticing package of rules that can 
conflict with state practice and produce profoundly different outcomes in 
cases.  Were these results neutral, they would not be so troublesome; 
however, procedural differences in the federal courts typically 
disadvantage plaintiffs, not defendants, and so provide an increasing 
incentive for defendant forum shopping. 
The growing hostility of the federal courts to plaintiffs’ tort claims 
is old news to repeat defendants who have always found the national 
 
 *  Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law.  Copyright 2004, all rights 
reserved.  I wish to thank my colleagues Ivan Bodensteiner and Laura Gaston Dooley for their 
comments and suggestions regarding this Article.  I also wish to thank my research assistants 
Joanne Kagler and Matthew Doherty for their assistance. 
 1. By the phrase “tort law,” I include not only the standard torts, such as negligence, but the 
modern concepts of strict products liability and related topics. 
 2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), by holding that there is 
no federal general common law and that except in matters governed by the Constitution or 
congressional legislation, the law to be applied by federal courts in diversity cases is the law of the 
state). 
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courts more congenial.3  However, with Congress’ recent efforts to 
enlarge diversity jurisdiction through the Multiparty Multiforum 
Jurisdiction Act4 of 2002 (sometimes referred to as the “MPMFJA”) and 
the pending Class Action Fairness Act (sometimes referred to as the 
“CAFA”),5 the invitation to enter the federal arena is overt.  Now the 
 
 3. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Class Action Update 2002: Mass Tort Trends, Choice of Law 
Rule 23(f) Appeals, and Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, in Civil Practice and Litigation 
Techniques in Federal and State Courts, SH009 ALI-ABA 1189, 1193 (2002) [hereinafter Cabraser 
2002].  A recently published study by the Federal Judicial Center shows that defense attorneys have 
a strong perception in class action cases that the federal forum is more beneficial to their clients’ 
interests and that they remove cases based on state law to the federal courts for that reason.  See 
Thomas E. Willging and Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Reports on the Impact of Anchem and 
Ortiz on Choice of a Federal or State Forum in Class Action Litigation, A Report to the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules Regarding A Case-based Survey of Attorneys, 4- 5,7-8, 18, 29-31 (Federal 
Judicial Center, April 2004) [hereinafter “FJC, Attorney Reports”], available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/newweb/jnetweb.nsf/autoframe?openform&url_r=pages/556&url_l=index (last 
visited May 12, 2004).  Whether the defendant attorneys’ belief is justified is an open question.  The 
study indicates that the rate of class certification by state and federal judges for the sample involved 
is virtually the same.  However, the study also reported that federal judges were more than twice as 
likely to deny class certification.  Id. at 4, 8-9.  This puzzling result is in part attributable to the fact 
that in the majority of cases, state courts never reached the certification question.  Id. at 34-36.  
Other factors that make the study hard to assess are that it was based on attorney survey responses 
and only 39% responded, and that comparative data were culled from cases that had been removed 
to federal court and then remanded on the assumption that the removed-then-remanded cases were 
not significantly different from the cases retained by the federal courts. For the study methodology, 
see id. at 2, 8-9. 
 4. 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (West 2003) (providing that federal district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action involving minimal diversity between adverse parties that arises from 
a single accident, where at least 75 natural persons have died in an accident at a discrete location 
under specified circumstances). 
 5. The proposed Class Action Fairness Act passed the House of Representatives in 2003.  
See Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, H.R. 1115, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter CAFA, H.R. 
1115].  The Senate version is still pending and is the subject of compromise.  See Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2003, S. 274, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter CAFA, S. 274].  Since the late 1990s, 
a number of bills have been introduced in Congress that can be broadly denominated as dealing with 
class action fairness or jurisdiction.  For instance, a bill entitled the “Interstate Class Action 
Jurisdiction Act of 1999,” appeared in the House of Representatives in 1999.  H.R. 1875, 106th 
Cong. (1999).  1999 also saw the introduction of a bill in the Senate.  Class Action Fairness Act of 
1999, S. 353, 106th Cong. (1999); see also 67 U.S.L.W. 2723 (June 8, 1999).  Similarly in 2001, 
H.R. 2341, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2001, appeared.  See H.R. 2341, 107th Cong. (2001). 
The Senate version was also the Class Action Fairness Act of 2001, S. 1712, 107th Cong. (2001).  
H.R. 2341 passed the House in 2001.  See 70 U.S.L.W. 2574 (March 19, 2002).  The legislation 
died in the Senate, as it never emerged from the Senate Judiciary Committee.  See 71 U.S.L.W. 
2583 (March 18, 2003).  The House of Representatives tried again in 2003 with the introduction of 
CAFA,  H.R. 1115, an act that was substantially similar to H.R. 2341.  CAFA, H.R. 1115 passed the 
House of Representatives on June 12, 2003.  See 149 Cong. Rec. H5307 (daily ed. June 12, 2003).  
CAFA, S. 274, the Senate version, then became the focal point of debate and compromise, because 
unlike the previous year, the bill was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee and passed out to 
the full Senate for consideration.  See 71 U.S.L.W. 2661 (April 22, 2003).  Opposition to CAFA, S. 
274, was strong and an attempt to invoke cloture to cut off debate was defeated by one vote.  See 72 
2
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national government intentionally uses its power to displace substantive 
law historically reserved to the states, but indirectly.  I dub this 
phenomenon “Procedural Swift.”  It is the strategy of creating federal tort 
law through the guise of regulating procedure.  Beyond its impact on 
substantive law or even federal-state relations, the phenomenon of 
Procedural Swift is most important for its corrosive effect on democratic 
values.  Defendants’ assertions that they are burdened by the American 
litigation system should be considered seriously.  But, when they pursue 
remedies designed to mask the changes in law they seek, this creates 
problems for democratic principles.  It is one thing to search for 
solutions to complex cases in a federal system; it is another to use 
complex litigation to hide law reform that could not gain public approval 
if its consequences were better known. 
My discussion is made in the spirit of an essay and proceeds in four 
major parts.  Part II, Diversity Jurisdiction and Democracy, describes 
the problematic connection between democratic values and diversity 
jurisdiction.6  It explains that when Congress deploys minimal diversity 
to make access to federal courts available in class action and mass tort 
cases there are potential risks to the role of states in promoting the 
democratic values of political participation, transparency, and 
accountability.  Part III, Complex Litigation—The Rationale for 
Intrusion relates these issues to the specific reforms in complex litigation 
recently initiated by Congress.7  Part IV, Tilting the Playing Field, 
shows how, once state-based cases are redirected to the federal forum by 
this legislation, the procedural regime there can yield substantially 
different results than state proceedings.8  The particular examples 
analyzed are federal standards for class certification, federal standards 
for summary judgment, and the development of federal “summary 
judgment substitutes.”  Together, they implicate a regime of “Procedural 
Swift,” in which state tort law is being reshaped through the national 
power to regulate procedure in diversity actions.  Finally, Part V, 
Diversity and Democracy Revisited concludes with the question whether 
the rationale of a uniform procedure for the federal courts really supports 
 
U.S.L.W. 2476 (February 17, 2004).  In February 2004, S. 2062, the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2004, was introduced in the Senate.  See Class Action Fairness Act of 2004, S. 2062, 108th Cong. 
(2004).  Its jurisdictional provisions are substantially similar to CAFA, S. 274, insofar as the key 
strategy is to rely on minimal diversity. For the moment, action on S. 2062 appears to have stalled.  
See 150 Cong. Rec. S1014, S1191 (daily ed. February 11, 2004)(placing S. 2062 on the calendar); 
see also 72 U.S.L.W. 2476 (February 17, 2004). 
 6. See infra notes 10-106 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra notes 107-215 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra notes 216-352 and accompanying text. 
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the risks to democratic principles that it currently represents.9 
II.  DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AND DEMOCRACY 
Federal diversity jurisdiction raises questions about democratic 
values.  To show this, I assume three hallmarks of a genuinely 
democratic system that should be noncontroversial: access to political 
participation, transparency in the process of lawmaking (whether by 
legislators or judges), and lawmakers’ accountability to the people for 
the consequences of their policy choices.  Using procedure to affect 
substantive law undermines all three. 
First, procedural principles are technical and arcane; by their nature 
they limit the information to people to make good decisions about the 
policy issues that are at stake.  This acts as a barrier to political 
participation and impedes transparency.  If a citizen cannot see the 
probable consequences of a change in mere “housekeeping” rules,10 
lawmaking becomes opaque, not transparent.  Secondly, many 
procedural principles are applied by judges, and judges are not as 
accountable to democratic majorities as are legislators.  This can create 
negative synergy.  When it is difficult to predict the consequences of 
procedural change and when either judges, legislators, or both might 
initiate it, holding policymakers accountable is more unlikely.  Finally, 
judicial decisions are dispersed and not as concentrated as legislation, so 
locating the focal points of policy shifts and overcoming coordination 
problems to oppose them are challenging.  Reorienting the locus of 
procedural change from the states to the federal forum magnifies these 
antidemocratic effects. 
Obviously, procedural maneuvering at the national level takes place 
one step removed from the political process of state lawmaking.  The 
democratic majority of any particular state has only a diluted effect on 
ultimate results.11  When procedural innovation emanates from the 
federal judiciary, accountability is a faint hope, for federal judges enjoy 
lifetime tenure.  Another problem is that one of the major sources of 
federal procedure is particularly undemocratic, namely the process of 
 
 9. See infra notes 353-55 and accompanying text. 
 10. See generally Judith Resnick, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in 
Federal Trial Courts, 24 GA. L. REV. 909 (1990) (emphasizing the misleading nature of the term 
“housekeeping”). 
 11. This results from the composition of Congress.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3 (providing 
that the U.S. House of Representatives shall be composed of representatives from the several states, 
selected by people from the several states). 
4
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rulemaking established by the Rules Enabling Act (“REA”).12  Pursuant 
to the REA, important modifications in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure are initiated not by popularly elected legislators, but by an 
elite group of specialists who make up the Advisory Committee.13  All 
these phenomena are troublesome for the democratic values embodied in 
the structural blueprint of the United States Constitution. 
To link questions about diversity jurisdiction with claims about 
democracy implicates federalism.14  This is complex, because the 
constitutional boundaries of federalism have been changing as the 
United States Supreme Court restricts Congress’ power to directly 
legislate on substance.  At the same time, debates over the normative 
values and ideologies associated with federalism suggest a greater 
willingness on the part of some academic commentators to promote the 
role of the federal government.15  Many who explore the “New 
Federalism” seek a more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of 
state/federal relations, particularly in the context of modern modes of 
living where territorial boundaries seem less important and issues of 
genuinely national concern never contemplated by the Founders arise.16  
Nonetheless, it is useful to remember the democratic virtues that can 
flow from conceiving states as prime instrumentalities of democracy on 
a smaller scale.  Akhil Amar has identified five different views of 
federalism.17  Among them are the concepts that states provide political 
safeguards of legal rights, associated with Herbert Wechsler and Justice 
William Brennan;18 that states are more decentralized political entities 
 
 12. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000) (providing that the Supreme Court shall have the power to 
prescribe the general rules of practice and procedure for federal courts and that all laws in conflict 
with such rules shall be of no further force or effect). 
 13. For a discussion of the rulemaking process pertinent to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in general, and the role of the Advisory Committee in particular, see Catherine T. Struve, 
The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
1099, 1103-12 (2000). 
 14. For instance, Martin H. Redish directly connects federalism to issues of political 
legitimacy and democratic theory but from an institutionalist perspective that stresses separation of 
powers.  See Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretative 
Process: An “Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761, 766-67 (1989) [hereinafter 
Redish].  One wonders whether his claim that Congress is more attentive to the claims of states than 
the federal courts holds true today. 
 15. See, e.g., Symposium, Constructing a New Federalism: Jurisdictional Competition and 
Competence, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1996). 
 16. See Judith Resnick, Afterward: Federalism’s Options, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 465, 485-503 
(1996) [hereinafter Resnick, Federalism’s Options]. 
 17. Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in Context, 47 VAND. L. 
REV. 1229 (1994). 
 18. Id. at 1240-46. 
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competing with the federal government, associated with Alexis de 
Tocqueville and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor;19 and that states are 
laboratories for social and political experiment, associated with Justice 
Felix Frankfurter and Justice Louis Brandeis.20  None of these theories 
alone constitutes a complete account of federalism, but all three contain 
a common element—the positive effects of the states as core units of 
government for citizen participation and the protection of citizen rights.  
In this sense, they directly link the states with democratic norms through 
the filter of federalism and it is this link that I will develop here. 
Herbert Wechsler wrote that federalism calls for “government 
responsiveness to the will of the full national constituency, without the 
loss of responsiveness to lesser voices, reflecting smaller bodies of 
opinion, in areas that constitute their own legitimate concern.”21  As the 
states were invested with plenary power under the Constitution, 
Wechsler argued that, 
National action has thus always been regarded as exceptional in our 
polity, an intrusion to be justified by some necessity, the special rather 
than the ordinary case.  This point of view cuts even deeper than the 
concept of the central government as one of granted, limited 
authority . . . . The political logic of federalism thus supports placing 
the burden of persuasion on those urging national action.22 
The states’ authority over most ground-level legal rights and duties 
tracks without our intuitions that the rules of law that govern everyday 
relations—how we make contracts, buy and sell property, whether we 
are liable for harms we cause by accident or intentionally—should be 
regulated at the communal echelon of social relations and in the 
localities in which they occur.  In the context of tort law, and 
underscoring the role of states as providers of smaller scale democracy, 
the fact that liability determinations are typically fixed by state juries, 
who are more closely connected to events than are federal juries, 
advances this role.23  But a cautionary note is needed here.  Any account 
 
 19. Id. at 1236-40. 
 20. Id. at 1233-36. 
 21. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in 
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543 (1954). 
 22. Id. at 544-45. 
 23. This is because the geographic region from which the federal jury is selected is 
significantly larger than a state jury pool.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2000).  For the effect that moving 
to the federal forum has on the composition of juries in the criminal context, particularly as the 
relevant political community is implicated, see Laura Gaston Dooley, The Dilution Effect: 
Federalization, Fair Cross Sections, and the Concept of Community (forthcoming 2004, manuscript 
on file with author). 
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of democratic principles that focuses on state power must confront the 
sordid reality that states’ rights have been used to facilitate 
discrimination.  In fact, it is in just this area of social relations that 
federal power is most needed.24  But the wretched history of race, sex 
and other forms of discrimination practiced by local state political 
majorities does not mean that the ideal of democracy on a small scale is 
in principle unjustified.  In a healthy-functioning federal system, citizens 
should have the opportunity to participate in policy decisions on a plane 
close to them culturally, economically, and geographically—especially 
on the question of the continued relevance of common law principles 
determining their everyday relations.  The primacy of localism and 
community must be checked by the national power, for example, when 
they become excuses for disadvantaging persons on the basis of suspect 
classifications.25  Seen in this light, focusing on the states as the 
repositories of tort law should not impinge on the federal government’s 
essential role in insuring individual and civil rights.  To hold otherwise 
is tantamount to jettisoning the states as essential democratic units of 
government in the American system altogether. 
All these considerations should be related to Congress’ efforts to 
enlarge the national judicial power using complex litigation as the 
justification.  What to do about complex litigation is not a neutral 
question of modernizing procedure.  Because a significant portion of 
these cases—for instance class actions based on products liability—
depend on state law, problematizing complex litigation problematizes 
the question of which sector of government, state or federal, has the 
authority to resolve the policy questions that arise.  As Deborah R. 
Hensler notes, the empirical data regarding their worth is equivocal.26  It 
follows that deciding whether state class actions are warranted is a 
political judgment.27  Richard A. Nagareda’s work on opt-out in 
settlements of damage class actions underscores this point.28  For him, 
damage class actions are institutional rivals to lawmaking and ought to 
 
 24. See Resnick, Federalism’s Options, supra note 16, at 493-94. 
 25. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
 26. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS 
FOR PRIVATE GAIN 466-67 (2000) [hereinafter HENSLER ET AL., DILEMMAS]. 
 27. See Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action 
and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179, 204 (2001) [hereinafter 
Hensler, Revisiting]. 
 28. See generally Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of Class 
Actions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (2003) [hereinafter Nagareda] (arguing in favor of the 
development of a coherent explanation for the distinction between mandatory and opt-out classes in 
order to arrive at a theory of the class action as a whole). 
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occupy a role intermediate between public law and private litigation.29  
For this reason, maintaining the individual’s right to opt-out of court-
imposed class actions settlements must be preserved to limit the 
monopoly power that might obtain to class counsel in the class action 
context.30  Importantly, Nagareda connects this issue to the problems of 
political accountability: 
The preexistence principle [the notion that claimants have preexisting 
rights that cannot be settled without their consent] stands as a brake 
upon the tendency of the class action toward a kind of “central 
planning,” a cautionary check upon the temptation characteristics of all 
central planning schemes of governance to impose contested 
enterprises of law reform in a manner insulated from political 
accountability.31 
If court-imposed settlements in class actions show central planning 
features, procedurally based rationales for redirecting these actions to the 
federal arena are more suspect on accountability grounds.  These 
phenomena connect to what Judith Resnick has described as the 
“programmatic” federal judiciary,32 one in which the Judicial 
Conference, outside the role of deciding cases, affects access to the 
federal forum and finds itself conscripted by tort reform and other 
groups to lobby Congress on legislation affecting their interests.33  But 
this raises another point that must be uncovered and analyzed.  It is the 
implicit claim to “tit-for-tat” that lies behind tort reform efforts to 
enlarge federal subject matter jurisdiction. 
Clearly tort reform advocates feel sorely used by the states.34  In 
that connection they decry what they take as illegitimate plaintiff forum 
shopping to state, not federal, tribunals.35  Behind their complaints lies 
the suppressed premise that all forum shopping should be treated equally 
 
 29. Id. at 153-58 (suggesting that one must understand what the class action device is and is 
not before productive debate over its suitability as a vehicle for achieving external policy goals can 
begin). 
 30. Id. at 162. 
 31. Id. at 196-97 (footnote omitted). 
 32. See Judith Resnick, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and 
Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 296 (2003) [hereinafter Resnick, Constricting Remedies]. 
 33. Id. at 297-298. 
 34. See, e.g., American Tort Reform Association, Facts About Tort Liability and its Impact on 
Consumers, available at http://www.atra.org/files.cgi/7366_Facts-Impact-On-Economy03.htm (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2004). 
 35. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2003, S. REP. 
NO. 108-123 § IV.B.4 (2003) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT] (observing that sometimes class counsel 
will file similar class actions before different courts in an effort to find a receptive judge who will 
rapidly certify a class). 
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and that plaintiffs’ choice of state courts for their claims is properly 
countered by defendants’ resort to the federal courts.  But this approach 
ignores the allocation of power to determine substantive law made in the 
Constitution itself.  The states are invested with plenary power over 
everyday law.  Thus, when state law creates substantive liability the 
forum selection question is not neutral.  The surface features of diversity 
jurisdiction concede this.  First, the traditional requirement of complete 
diversity of citizenship makes it more, not less, difficult to elect the 
federal forum.36  Even where diversity jurisdiction is possible, the Erie 
doctrine stands for the principle that moving from the state to the federal 
spheres is not supposed to yield a different outcome in terms of 
substantive law.  But, if this is the case, why do defendants so 
vigorously agitate to open up the federal courts?  Understanding this 
requires understanding the trajectory of the tort reform movement over 
the last decades and the potential for affecting substance through 
procedure notwithstanding the intended limits of Erie. 
A.  The Pathways of Tort Reform 
The most aggressive proponents of tort reform would simply 
federalize state tort law,37 but they have not been able to achieve this 
goal.  There are a variety of reasons for this.  The first, as might be 
surmised from the preceding discussion, is the structural framework of 
the Constitution itself.  It allocates the power to make law between the 
federal government and the states, and in so doing, instantiates the 
American brand of federalism.  The key feature of federalism is that it 
retains the states as unavoidable components of government.  Entities 
that act on a national basis still must contend with the power of states to 
promulgate laws that will govern their duties and liabilities.  In fact, as 
John S. Baker, Jr., has pointed out, national actors are reluctant to 
acknowledge the implications of federalism: 
Federalism itself promotes a certain “bias” against corporations and 
businesses that operate interstate.  As compared to a confederation, 
federalism does facilitate trade; but compared to a unitary state, 
federalism can present obstacles to the efficiency of trade.  State laws 
regularly raise transaction costs for corporations because the laws of 
one state differ from the laws of other states.  Indeed, when national 
 
 36. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267 (1806) (establishing the principle of complete 
diversity). 
 37. See American Tort Reform Association, ATRA’s Agenda: Fair Laws, Fair Judges, Fair 
Courts, available at http://www.atra.org (last visited Apr. 11, 2004). 
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corporations challenge particular state laws under the “dormant” 
Commerce Clause, they claim a particular law “discriminates” either in 
purpose or effect against or has too great an impact on interstate 
commerce.  Large interstate corporations tend not to favor federalism 
because they think it reduces the size of their potential profit.38 
Despite this reality, and according to the standard account, the federal 
government was conceived as a government of limited, enumerated 
powers.39  The division of lawmaking power found in Article I cabins 
Congress’ ability to pass legislation to a list of specified topics of 
particularly national interest.40  In contrast, the Tenth Amendment 
declares that the “powers not delegated to the United States” are 
“reserved to the States . . . or to the people.”41  While commentators 
have disputed the ultimate range of Congress’ power to affect the 
common law,42 when the Constitution was ratified, everyday relations 
were generally governed by well-established principles of the common 
law or tenets of equity inherited from the English legal system and 
embodied in cases.  Despite the controversy that raged between 
Federalists and Republicans over the federal common law of crimes in 
the era of the Alien and Sedition Acts,43 it is unlikely that the Framers 
intended the common law of contracts, torts, domestic relations, and 
 
 38. See John S. Baker, Jr., Respecting a State’s Tort Law, While Confining Its Reach to that 
State, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 698, 704 (2001) [hereinafter Baker] (footnotes omitted). 
 39. How powerful the new national government actually would be of course was the sticking 
point in the Federalist/Antifederalist debate over the ratification of the Constitution.  See JoEllen 
Lind, Liberty, Community, and the Ninth Amendment, 54 OHIO ST. L.J.1259, 1293-96 (1993). 
 40. That is, laws to provide for the national defense, to establish bankruptcy and copyright 
protection, and to regulate interstate commerce, among others.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  
Congress was also imbued with the power to establish the lower federal courts. 
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 42. For instance Stewart Jay makes this point: 
Apart from cases in which Congress has conferred authority on courts to develop 
substantive rules of decision, the modern Supreme Court has restricted federal common 
law to ‘such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of the 
United States, interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of 
States or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases.’  Federal common law 
is often referred to as ‘specialized.’  It is invoked as a ‘necessary expedient’ in a ‘few 
and restricted’ instances. . . .  In short, the difference between the ‘general’ jurisdiction 
of state judiciaries and the ‘limited’ jurisdiction of federal courts lies in the conception of 
the common law appropriate for the respective systems. . . .  For federal courts, there is 
yet another aspect of the matter, which is an apparent preference—shared by many in the 
federal and state judiciaries—for maintaining power and responsibility at the state and 
local levels. . . .  [T]his federalism concern is partly inspired by the attitude that diffusion 
of decisionmaking is more likely to promote democratic values. 
Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1007-08 (1985) 
(footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Jay]. 
 43. Id. at 1014-19. 
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typical crimes to be within the routine power of the federal courts.  
Certainly, after the appearance of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins in 1938, 
there has been little practical question that the states’ plenary power over 
common law actions was final, subject to the protection of the Bill of 
Rights,44 or the national government’s ability to make substantive law 
through the Commerce Power.45 
Given this structural barrier, the first attempts to realize the agenda 
of tort reform were directed at states.46  Over more than two decades, 
states have passed legislation capping noneconomic damages, restricting 
the collateral source rule, revamping punitive damages, limiting medical 
malpractice liability, shortening the statute of limitations for tort claims, 
limiting attorneys’ fees in classes of cases, and instituting other 
techniques to cure the alleged explosion of supposedly meritless cases 
earning unjustifiably large verdicts from “runaway” juries.47  But 
another reason why the proponents of tort reform have not been able to 
redefine the law as they wish soon arose—legislative and judicial 
opposition.  While some states passed tort reform, others did not in the 
face of stringent objections by consumers, trial lawyers, and other 
groups.  Even in states where new laws replaced old principles,48 these 
 
 44. Individual rights guarantees from the Bill of Rights are incorporated against the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment and trump contrary state law.  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 482-86 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter 
CHEMERINSKY] (tracing the evolution and current resolution of the incorporation debate). 
 45. Historic, demographic, and technologic changes such as the rise of the national 
corporation, mass marketing, World War II, and even the Civil Rights Movement, all contributed to 
a significant expansion of the commerce power.  See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) 
(concluding that regulating the growing of winter wheat on a small farm for home consumption 
comes within federal commerce power).  Only in the last decade has the United States Supreme 
Court tried to put the genie back into the bottle with a series of cases designed to reign in Congress’ 
prerogatives under the Commerce Clause.  See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
(holding that a federal statute, providing a civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence, 
exceeded Congress’ Commerce Clause authority because gender-motivated violence is not an 
economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
115 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act, making it an offense for an individual to 
knowingly possess a firearm in a school zone, exceeded Congress’ Commerce Clause authority 
because possession of a gun in a school zone is not an economic activity that substantially affects 
interstate commerce). 
 46. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 170 
(3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter LAYCOCK]. 
 47. Hence the title of John Grisham’s book.  See JOHN GRISHAM, THE RUNAWAY JURY 
(1996).  It its difficult not to lapse into the hyperbolic language of proponents of tort reform who 
typically describe the state of American litigation in extreme terms.  See, e.g., American Tort 
Reform Association, Bringing Justice to Judicial Hellholes, available at 
http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes (last visited Apr. 11, 2004). 
 48. See LAYCOCK, supra note 46, at 170.  For a general history of the tort reform movement 
that is highly critical of the phenomenon, see Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the 
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could be taken away when the courts of a state struck reform legislation 
as unconstitutional on state grounds.49  The inability to achieve tort 
reform across the board as a bottom-up strategy became especially 
significant with the rise of the nationwide state class action.50  This 
meant that if even one holdout jurisdiction existed, it might become a 
magnet for litigation with nationwide implications on a defendant’s 
conduct.51  In fact, many states did not pass the complete package of 
laws desired by proponents.52  In response to these phenomena and with 
the changing fortunes of the national political parties, the tort reform 
movement began to contemplate the power of the federal government as 
a tool to impose its program on recalcitrant states. 
In 1994, when it gained control of Congress, the Republican Party 
introduced the “Contract With America.”53  This legislation would have 
federalized significant areas of state tort law.54  Its focal points were the 
proposed “Common Sense Products Liability Reform Act,” and the 
“Common Sense Legal Standards Reform Act.”55  Opposition was 
immediate, public, and multifaceted.  Moreover, President Clinton 
vetoed the legislation that did pass and commentators expressed doubt as 
to its constitutionality.56  Where did that leave the movement for reform?  
If the states proved resistant to the tort reform agenda and if direct 
federal assaults on state tort law were too difficult to achieve, what of 
the federal judicial power, diversity jurisdiction, and the reality on the 
 
Tort Monster: The American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1 (2002). 
 49. See, e.g., Smith v. Dept. of Insurance, 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987) (holding that a Florida 
statute capping non-economic damages violated Florida’s constitution because neither an 
overpowering public necessity for abolishment nor an alternative method of redress was shown).  
For a “map” of the status of state tort reform, see American Tort Reform Association’s, Civil Justice 
Reforms, available at http://www.atra.org/states (last visited Apr. 11, 2004). 
 50. Most commentators ascribe the increase in state class actions to the Supreme Court’s 1985 
opinion in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), which held that minimum contacts 
need not be shown between unnamed plaintiff class members and the forum state; opening the way 
for state class actions with extra-territorial reach. 
 51. In fact, counties in Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Texas and other states have 
been so characterized.  See American Tort Reform Association, Bringing Justice to Judicial 
Hellholes, available at http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes (last visited on Apr. 11, 2004). 
 52. See LAYCOCK, supra note 46, at 170. 
 53. See Michael J. Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law: The Republican Attack on Women, Blue 
Collar Workers and Consumers, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 674-82 (1996). 
 54. Id. at 674. 
 55. See Carl Tobias, Common Sense and Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REV. 699, 700-
34 (1995).  See also Mark J. Wolff, Sex, Race, and Age: Double Discrimination in Torts and Taxes, 
78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341, 1433-34 nn.591-92 (2000). 
 56. See generally Patrick Hoopes, Note, Tort Reform in the Wake of United States v. Lopez, 
24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 785 (1997). 
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ground that procedural rules can profoundly impact substantive results? 
B.  The Federal Judicial Power, the Erie Doctrine, and Manipulating 
Diversity 
The “judicial power” of the federal government typically connotes 
the landmark principle of judicial review, which was established by 
Chief Justice Marshall’s celebrated opinion in Marbury v. Madison57 and 
which secured the unique role of the United States Supreme Court in the 
checks-and-balances scheme of the federal system.58  However, in 
discussing the federal judicial power here, I mean to focus on its role 
vis-à-vis the states in terms of the structural constitution.59  In this 
context, it is key that Congress has the authority under Article I to 
establish the lower federal courts.60  But, in keeping with the notion that 
the federal government is one of limited power, Article III binds the 
federal judiciary so that the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts 
is restricted, not general.61  Consistent with this theme, Article III gives 
federal courts original jurisdiction over federal questions—matters of 
uniquely national concern, for they involve treaties, the federal 
constitution, or congressional enactments made under Article I.62  Article 
III also invested the federal courts with the power to hear claims based 
on state law if they were between citizens from more than one state, or a 
state and a foreign nation.63  This was the concept of “diversity” 
jurisdiction that was deeply distrusted by the Antifederalists, who were 
wary of the impact of a strong national government on local democratic 
majorities.64 
 
 57. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 58. See generally William Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE 
L.J. 1 (1969) (examining the historical context of the decision and analyzing the opinion in terms of 
various approaches that might have been used by Chief Justice Marshall). 
 59. The judicial power is established by Article III of the United States Constitution.  See U.S. 
CONST. art. III. 
 60. The only federal court that must exist according Article III is the United States Supreme 
Court: “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such 
other inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”  U.S. CONST. art. 
III, § 1.  See also U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 9 (establishing Congress’ power to establish federal 
courts inferior to the United States Supreme Court). 
 61. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. The Antifederalists were also deeply concerned about the impact on states from suits by 
out-of-state creditors to enforce revolutionary debt.  See Paul E. McGreal, Saving Article I from 
Seminole Tribe: A View from the Federalist Papers, 55 SMU L. REV. 393, 399-402 (2002).  See 
also, Christina G. Heslinga, Note, The Founders Go On-Line: An Original Intent Solution to a 
Jurisdictional Dilemma, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 247, 250-51 (2000).  See generally Wythe 
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In fact, whether the lower federal courts should exist at all was a 
major point of contention during the Constitutional Convention.65  The 
reasons the Framers adopted diversity jurisdiction are contested.66  
Certainly diversity jurisdiction made it possible for state policies 
expressed by local juries to be obviated by the device of placing a 
controversy in the hands of a federal instrumentality.67  Alexander 
Hamilton argued in the Federalist that the federal courts were needed, 
among other reasons, because the independence of state court judges 
from local influence was in doubt.68  Ironically, however, the first statute 
creating the lower federal courts, the Judiciary Act of 1789,69 did not 
invest them with general federal question jurisdiction, but only 
authorized diversity jurisdiction.  Perhaps in an attempt to mediate 
between the concerns for local democratic majorities and problems of 
national scope, the Judiciary Act of 178970 did require that the rules of 
decision in diversity cases must be premised on “[t]he laws of the 
several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United 
States or Acts of Congress shall otherwise provide.”71  However, the 
statute’s general reference to “laws” left an ambiguity that was to prove 
a major obstacle to federalism in the following century. 
The period from 1789 up to 1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure were promulgated,72 witnessed an odd, even counterintuitive, 
amalgam of principles governing federal courts.  First, diversity actions 
and proceedings generated by specialized federal statutes made up 
federal cases until Congress granted a more general federal question 
 
Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics and the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the 
Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421; Jay, supra note 42, at 1012-13; Stewart Jay, Origins of 
Federal Common Law, Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231 (1985). 
 65. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 35. 
 66. See Holt, supra note 64, at 1467-75. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Michael G. Collins, Judicial Independence and the Scope of Art. III—A View from the 
Federalist,  685-91 U. RICH. L. REV. (2004). 
 69. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 
1332 (2000)) [hereinafter Judiciary Act of 1789].  Federal questions were actually handled by state 
courts; it was not until 1875 that general original federal question subject matter jurisdiction was 
invested in the lower federal courts, save for a brief grant effectuated by the “Midnight Judges Act,” 
the subject of Marbury, in 1801.  See RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 221, 221 n.* (3d ed. 2001). 
 70. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 14.  See also Redish, supra note 14, at 762. 
 71. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 34 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000)). 
 72. See generally Jack B. Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1988) [hereinafter Weinstein] 
(discussing the judicial and social change influenced by the passage and evolution of the Rules 
Enabling Act). 
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authority after the Civil War.73  Secondly, the procedural rules for the 
federal courts were not national, but instead borrowed from states 
pursuant to the Conformity Act.74  Thus, the technique of manipulating 
procedural principles to indirectly control results in diversity cases was 
not available.  More important, it was not needed, for in the mid 
nineteenth century, the federal courts took a direct route: they embarked 
upon a project of developing federal common law to supplant the 
common law of the states. 
As we have seen, the Antifederalists worried that the judicial power 
could provide the national government with a back door for intruding on 
state prerogatives.  Their concern proved well-founded75 when, in 1852, 
federal courts began to erect a federal national law, usually one that 
facilitated trade and economic interests.76  The decision that initiated the 
regime was Swift v. Tyson.77  Swift created a topsy-turvy world in 
diversity cases—federal, not state, substantive law was applied, but 
state, not federal, procedure governed.  During this era, plaintiffs and 
defendants shopped to the federal forum whenever they could gain the 
benefit of a different rule of law.78  Often, the parties who profited most 
were repeat defendants, who sought the federal forum wherever 
 
 73. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. 
 74. The regime was instituted by the Conformity Act, Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5-6, 17 
Stat. 196, 197.  It was not until Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act in 1938, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 
(2000), authorizing the creation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and instituting the modern 
regime of federal rulemaking, that a uniform procedure in the federal courts became a normative 
principle undergirded by the Constitution. 
 75. See Holt, supra note 64, at 1466-71. 
 76. See generally EDWARD PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL 
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 1870-1958 (1992) (analyzing the litigation 
process from the 1870s to the 1940s between individual plaintiffs and national corporations over 
contract claims for insurance benefits and tort claims for personal injuries). 
 77. 41 U.S. 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  In Swift, New 
York’s common law rule that assignees of contracts are subject to the underlying claims and 
defenses, including fraud, of one who seeks to avoid performance, was trumped by the emerging 
federal commercial concept of “the holder-in-due-course,” an entity who could sue to enforce a note 
immune from such defenses.  Id. at 2-3.  Premising its conclusions on a contested and now largely 
discredited jurisprudential theory—that judges do not make law but merely find it—Justice Story 
opined that the phrase “laws of the several states” from the Rules of Decision Act did not include 
the common law.  Id. at 4-6.  Thus, with regard to issues of “general law,” and where no state statute 
or constitutional provision applied, the federal courts were free to identify the general principles 
themselves.  Justice Story suggested that federal courts were just as competent, if not more 
competent, in “finding” general law than state courts, and so could ignore state common law cases.  
Id. at 8-12. 
 78. Probably the most extreme example, one regaled in the casebooks and Erie itself, is Black 
& White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928), in which a party 
disincorporated in one state and reincorporated in another just to gain the benefit of diversity 
jurisdiction and the opportunity to rely on federal, not state, common law. 
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possible.  According to some commentators, Swift secured the federal 
courts as “business courts” used by corporations to resist the claims of 
workers seeking redress for injuries.79  In 1938, this topsy-turvy world 
was reoriented by two monumental developments: the creation of the 
Federal Rules of Procedure and the overruling of Swift by Justice 
Brandeis’ historic decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.80 
The rationale for uniform procedural rules seems obvious from our 
contemporary vantage point.  The idea of one body of rules that would 
determine federal court practice regardless of jurisdiction is intuitively 
appealing and produces obvious efficiencies.  Moreover, having all the 
federal rules emanate from one source and making them subject to a 
regularized rulemaking process overseen by the United States Supreme 
Court and Congress created an opportunity for a coordinated 
modernization.  One of the greatest achievements of the FRCP was the 
merger of law and equity, so that litigants were no longer faced with the 
risk of falling between two different court systems,81 as well as the 
initiation of modern concepts of discovery82 and notice pleading.83  The 
initial package of federal rules still provides the core principles of 
litigation in the federal courts today.  Erie appeared in the same year as 
the FRCP and the relationship between the two would prove intricate 
and problematic over time. 
Understood at its most direct level, Erie overruled Swift for the 
purpose of establishing that the national enterprise of making common 
law through the federal courts was improper.  Justice Brandeis’ words, 
though often noted, bear repeating here: 
There is no federal general common law.  Congress has no power to 
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether 
they be local in their nature or “general,” be they commercial law or 
the law of torts.  And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer 
such a power on the federal courts.84 
Despite this unmistakable message, its legal underpinnings have 
 
 79. See HOWARD FINK & MARK TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE 
190 (2d ed. 1987).  As Ann Woolhandler and Michael G. Collins describe it, federal courts 
employed diversity jurisdiction after Swift particularly to protect contract and property rights in the 
face of local majorities and in a way that was ineluctably tied to policing the jury.  See Ann 
Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, The Article III Jury, 87 VA. L. REV. 587, 600 (2001). 
 80. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 81. See FED. R. CIV. P. 3. 
 82. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37. 
 83. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 84. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
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been unclear and disputed.85  Yet, the gravitational pull of Erie is 
decidedly constitutional, and its clear direction is that federal courts in 
diversity are to constitute themselves as quasi-state tribunals, applying 
the law of the state giving rise to the claims presented.  Thus, federal 
courts in diversity cases supposedly have to take state law as they find it, 
for better or worse, subject to their ability to force state-based claims 
within the form and mode of federal litigation.  This simple prescription 
did not last long, as the difficulty of discerning what is substance and 
what is procedure soon arose. 
To make a very long story short, by the decision in Guaranty Trust 
v. York, 86 the Supreme Court introduced a test for determining how to 
classify a conflict between state and federal law in a diversity action as 
substantive or procedural—the test of outcome determination.  But this 
standard proved too much and exposed the FRCP to attack on Erie 
grounds.87  After all, almost any FRCP might determine the outcome in a 
case.  Following York, an era of temporizing ensued in which the Court 
attempted to avoid the problem by defining away apparent clashes 
between state practice and the federal rules.88  In 1957, Byrd v. Blue 
Ridge Rural Electrical Cooperative89 introduced a balancing test to blunt 
the impact of the outcome determination standard and reduced the need 
for legal fictions.90  But, as with all balancing tests, Byrd could not 
insure the immunity of the FRCP to Erie attack under all circumstances.  
Finally with its opinion in Hanna v. Plumer91 the Court introduced a new 
analytical framework for assessing the status of a federal rule that 
conflicts with a state practice in a diversity case. 
For the Hanna court, the FRCP (and federal procedural statutes) do 
 
 85. On one level, the decision could simply be premised on the idea that Swift misread the 
Rules of Decision Act and erroneously excluded common law from the “laws” of the states.  If it did 
not,  this is in tension with the opinion of some that diversity jurisdiction itself might have been 
used to confer a power on the federal courts to craft a national law designed to remove bias against 
out-of-staters.  See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 701-02 
(1974) [hereinafter Ely, Myth]; Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1985). 
 86. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
 87. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 88. See, e.g., Ragan v. Merchts. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (holding 
that FRCP 3 does not apply to determine tolling of statute of limitations for state-based claims); 
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) (deciding what law should apply when 
corporation fails to register to do business in a state); Cohen v. Beneficial Indust. Loan Corp., 337 
U.S. 541 (1949) (holding the FRCP 23.1 bond requirement inapplicable to state-based derivative 
action). 
 89. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
 90. Id. at 537-39. 
 91. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
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not implicate Erie at all, as they trace their pedigree to a different origin 
than federal judge-made rules, i.e., in the case of the FRCP, to the Rules 
Enabling Act.92  In turn, the REA traces to a proper exercise of one of 
Congress’ powers enumerated in Article I—the power to establish the 
inferior federal courts.  And, the need for a uniform procedure to run 
those courts falls within the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause of 
Article I.93  Thus, the application of a FRCP is no real problem for 
federalism for, if it arguably regulates procedure, it traces to Congress’ 
Article I authority.  There is one catch however.  According to the REA 
itself, a federal rule that displaces state law too much could still be 
prohibited.94  However, this limitation in the REA has proven toothless 
over the years, as FRCP that affect substantive rights (for instance FRCP 
35, which abridges the right of privacy)95 have survived challenge.  And, 
recently, the difficulty of keeping the Erie line of cases distinct from the 
Hanna line has become more challenging, as federal courts continue to 
issue decisions that construe the meaning of open-textured provisions of 
federal rules much in the manner of common law decision-making.96 
What is clear in the evolution from Swift through Erie to Hanna is 
that the opportunity for reshaping or displacing state law utilizing the 
federal judicial power persists through the federal courts’ power to 
regulate procedure.  With the appearance of Hanna v. Plumer in 1965, 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and federal procedural statutes 
were effectively immunized from displacement by conflicting state 
law.97  This underscores that diversity jurisdiction and the Erie/Hanna 
line of decisions themselves are as much about democracy as they are 
about forum shopping and the inequitable administration of the laws.98  
While they do impose restrictions and limitations on the federal 
judiciary, they also preserve the constitutional space for federal courts to 
determine procedural policies, in the main.  When this power over 
procedure intersects with diversity jurisdiction, it creates the risks for 
political participation, transparency, and accountability that I have 
identified.  Moreover, because the possibility exists of effecting 
 
 92. Id. at 472.  See also Weinstein, supra note 72, at 23. 
 93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 19. 
 94. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) provides: “Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any 
substantive right.” 
 95. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1941). 
 96. Consider, for example, the dispute between Justices Ginsburg and Scalia over which line 
of cases governed the dispute over grounds for new trial in Gasperini v. Center for the Humanities, 
518 U.S. 415, 467-68 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 468. 
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substance through procedure via diversity, those who cannot achieve 
changes in law at the state level now wish to make federal diversity 
jurisdiction, more, not less, available.  This raises the next point—
Congress’ rediscovery of “minimal diversity.” 
In the 1806 decision of Strawbridge v. Curtiss,99 Chief Justice 
Marshall established what is known as the requirement of “complete 
diversity,”100 meaning that no commonality of citizenship can be shared 
by opposing parties.  Complete diversity is a substantial impediment to 
moving state cases to the federal forum, for in controversies involving 
numerous parties, some commonality of citizenship is likely, or a litigant 
seeking to prevent diversity jurisdiction can add a nondiverse party, so 
long as the requirements of joinder are present.101  However, in light of 
the policy that federal subject matter jurisdiction is limited, not plenary, 
and to reduce the intrusion on state prerogatives that diversity 
jurisdiction can present, the requirement of complete diversity is 
coherent.  This restricts resort to federal courts for state-based litigation 
only where prejudice against noncitizens is likely to be significant.  Until 
recently, Congress and the federal judiciary had been considering 
jettisoning diversity jurisdiction altogether as modern travel and mass 
communications have made the assumptions of parochialism 
underpinning it unjustified.102  Even though these factors have not 
produced the total elimination of diversity jurisdiction, Congress 
continues to increase the amount in controversy requirement so that only 
larger cases reach the federal courts.103  Thus, economics trumps the 
potential for prejudice under the current diversity statute.  All these 
considerations indicate that the requirement of complete diversity should 
not be relaxed absent extraordinary reasons.  One such extraordinary 
circumstance may have presented itself in 1917 when Congress passed 
the federal interpleader statute, thereby introducing the concept of 
minimal diversity as a way of opening up the federal courts.104 
Minimal diversity requires only that some degree of difference in 
 
 99. 7 U.S. 267 (1806). 
 100. See id. at 267-68. 
 101. These arise from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 and require that liability stem from 
the same transaction or occurrence, or series thereof, and demonstrate at least one issue of law or 
fact in common to the parties joined.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a). 
 102. See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION 
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 101 (1969) [hereinafter ALI, STUDY OF DIVISION].  See 
also Frank M. Coffin, Judicial Gridlock: The Case for Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction, 10 
BROOKINGS REV. 34, 34-39 (1992). 
 103. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000), in which the current amount in controversy is set at 
$75,000. 
 104. 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a) (2000). 
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citizenship between adverse parties be present.  In the interpleader 
statute, minimal diversity is provided if at least two adverse claimants to 
the same stake hail from different states.105  It is instructive that in the 
history of federal subject matter jurisdiction from 1806 to the present the 
requirement of complete diversity has rarely been relaxed and then only 
primarily to remedy through interpleader the obvious justice problems 
created for a defendant who must pay the same obligation twice.106  Yet 
the proponents of tort reform argue that minimal diversity should be 
used again to save them from the vagaries of state law.  
III.  “COMPLEX LITIGATION”—THE RATIONALE FOR INTRUSION 
Litigation can be “complex” for a variety of reasons.  The legal 
issues presented could be novel or intellectually challenging, the parties 
could be numerous, or the dispute could cross various state lines and 
generate multiple lawsuits in different locales.  Modernly, the meaning 
of “complex litigation” has come to stand for class action practice or 
multidistrict litigation involving mass torts (sometimes both) and is 
closely associated with federal techniques that have been developed to 
deal with these phenomena, such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 
governing class actions,107 the multidistrict litigation statute,108 and the 
Manual on Complex Litigation.109 
The first and most benign federal foray into the problems of 
complex litigation arose in the late 1960s in response to the problem of 
what has been called “scattered litigation,”110 that is, litigation involving 
 
 105. Id.  The purpose of making the federal forum more available in this form of proceeding 
was generated by the result in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916), where, due 
to the intersection of principles of personal jurisdiction and the characterization of interpleader 
actions as in personam, New York Life Insurance ended up having to pay the proceeds of a life 
insurance policy twice.  To avoid the possibility of this double liability being visited on frequent 
stakeholders, Congress acted and passed a package of legislation that provided for easy entry to a 
federal court, a minimal amount in controversy requirement of $500, nationwide service of process, 
and generous venue.  In State Farm Fire & Casualty v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967), the 
Supreme Court explicitly upheld the constitutionality of minimal diversity by making it clear that 
Strawbridge only construed the diversity statute, not the requirements of Article III. 
 106. Allowing “pendent party” jurisdiction so long as minimal diversity is present can be 
treated as another exception.  For instance, pendent party jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §1330, is possible so long as there is minimal diversity. See 13B 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §3567.2, at n.48 (Supp. 
West 2004). 
 107. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 108. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000). 
 109. See generally DAVID F. HERR, ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (3d ed. 
2003) [hereinafter MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION]. 
 110. See Thomas D. Rowe & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, 
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multiple parties from various jurisdictions making it difficult to confine 
the proceedings to one forum.111  In 1968, Congress dealt with the 
phenomenon of multiple parallel actions pending in the federal courts 
with the passage of legislation providing for transferring them to one 
court for pre-trial proceedings.112  The legislation also created a panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL”) to administer the process.113  While the 
emergence of  MDL practice provided for consolidation of scattered 
federal litigation, access to the MDL option still required that cases be 
within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts in the first 
instance.  Since many multidistrict events involve torts, which are 
creatures of state law, the requirement of complete diversity must be 
satisfied.  And, the more parties that are involved in an accident the less 
likely complete diversity can be shown.  This raised the possibility that 
in mass torts, multiple actions might be filed in different states that could 
not be consolidated in one location and generated calls to reform the 
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, much as it had been modified 
in 1917 to address interpleader.114  As with interpleader, the possibility 
of opening the federal forum depended upon utilizing the principle of 
minimal diversity. 
Three things are notable about the calls for reform that arose before 
the mid-1980s: they were sensitive to the plight of all parties, not just 
defendants; they were not overtly aimed at producing particular 
substantive outcomes; and they predated innovations in federal 
procedure that have increasingly burdened plaintiffs, such as changes in 
standards for class action certification, changes in summary judgment 
procedure, and the evolving principles governing expert opinion 
evidence. 
A.  The Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 2002 
After many attempts over more than a decade,115 the Multiparty, 
 
Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7, 11-12 (1986) [hereinafter Rowe & Sibley].  See also 
Linda S. Mullenix, Unfinished Symphony: The Complex Litigation Project Rests, 54 LA. L. REV. 
977 (1994) [hereinafter Mullenix, Unfinished Symphony] (documenting the work that remains of the 
ALI’s Complex Litigation Project agenda). 
 111. See Linda Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform and Article III Jurisdiction, 59 FORD. L. 
REV. 169, 220-21 (1990). 
 112. Under the current version of the statute, cases are to be returned to their home fora for 
trial.  See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407 (2000); see also Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Beshad Hynes & 
Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).  See infra text accompanying notes 117-120. 
 113. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000). 
 114. See ALI, STUDY OF DIVISION, supra note 102, at 375-76. 
 115. See, e.g., Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1989, H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 1st 
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Multiforum Jurisdiction Act became law in 2002 (“the MPMFJA” or 
“the Act”).116  A factor precipitating Congress’ attention to the problem 
of multidistrict litigation was its desire to redress Lexecon Inc. v. 
Milberg Weiss Beshad Hynes & Lerach,117 in which the Supreme Court 
concluded that cases transferred to a particular court as MDL matters 
could not be retained by that court for trial.118  Ironically, the version of 
the Act as passed does not address this problem.119 Instead, it makes 
dramatic changes in federal subject matter jurisdiction, because the Act 
constitutes the first grant of subject matter jurisdiction. 
The direct history of the multiparty, multiforum legislation that was 
enacted is sparse, as the bill was part of an omnibus package involved 
primarily with budgetary matters.  However committee reports to prior 
versions of the bill, such as H.R. 860, show that legislators were 
concerned over how federalizing mass accident cases would impact 
litigants and the states themselves.  As Representative Watt described it: 
For those of us who have been strong advocates for States’ rights, I 
think this is a radical departure.  When you start telling to a plaintiff 
who lives in a State, who is suing a defendant who lives in the same 
State, and you are going to apply that State’s laws that that case has to 
be litigated for that plaintiff, he has to go into the U.S. District Court, 
the Federal court, to litigate his claim, I think that is a radical departure 
from where we are at this point. . . .  Now let me just tell you that 
every small-town person on this committee ought to be alarmed by 
this, because in small towns there are not U.S. District Courts.  There 
are, in every county, State courts where individual plaintiffs can walk 
right down the street, file a lawsuit, and get their claim litigated.  You 
all make it sound like the whole purpose for the court system is for the 
convenience of the courts.  That is not the purpose of the court system.  
The purpose of the court system is for the convenience of litigants.120 
 
Sess. (1989); Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1990, H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1990). 
 116. Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11020(b)(1)(A), 116 Stat. 1826 [hereinafter MPMFJA].  As 
originally proposed, the Act required only twenty-five deaths; efforts are underway in Congress to 
amend the Act to reduce the number from seventy-five deaths to twenty-five deaths.  See 
Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 1768, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter 
Multidistrict Restoration Act].  See also 150 Cong. Rec. H. 1378 (daily ed. March 24, 2004). 
 117. 523 U.S. 26 (1998). 
 118. Id. at 40-41. 
 119. However the pending Multiforum Jurisdiction Restoration Act does allow retention for 
trial on liability of MDL consolidated matters and makes technical amendments to the MPMFJA.  
Compare MPMFJA, supra note 116, and Multidistrict Restoration Act, supra note 116. 
 120. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, MULTIDISTRICT, MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM TRIAL 
JURISDICTION ACT OF 2001, H.R. REP. NO. 107-14, at 30 (2001) [hereinafter House Report H.R. 
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Only by presenting H.R. 860 as a very narrow expansion of diversity 
jurisdiction applying only to a very restricted body of cases were 
proponents able to garner bipartisan support.121  As the Minority Report 
to H.R. 860 stated: 
It is our understanding that [the bill] would only apply to a very 
narrowly defined category of cases, such as, plane, train, bus, boat 
accidents and environmental spills, many of which may already be 
brought in federal court.  However, it would not apply to mass tort 
injuries that involve the same injury over and over again such as 
asbestos and breast implants.122 
Moreover, H.R. 860 added features to limit intrusions on state power, 
such as increasing the threshold for the relevant amount in controversy 
that previous versions of the bill did not contain.123  Backers were also 
eager to assure skeptics that multiforum legislation was not meant to 
create a presumption that Congress could easily invoke minimal 
diversity to displace state power or to smooth the path for other pending 
bills such as the Interstate Class Action Act, which threatened to redirect 
whole categories of proceedings based on state law to the federal sphere.  
As Representative Sheila Jackson Lee put it: 
H.R. 860 is a sharp distinction from the “Interstate Class Action 
Jurisdiction Act of 1999.”  Unlike H.R. 860, the class action bill 
requires only minimal diversity for all civil actions brought as class 
actions in federal court, regardless of the individual amounts in 
controversy, the number of separate incidents or injuries that may give 
rise to a class action, or the state-based nature of the claim.  Rather 
than providing a reasonable, limited modification to diversity 
jurisdiction, the class action bill—which I strongly oppose— 
represents a radical rewrite of the class action rules and would ban 
most forms of state class actions.124 
Despite all these caveats and limitations, the MPMFJA as enacted does 
intrude significantly on state power and in a way that undermines the 
democratic values of participation, transparency, and accountability.  To 
understand why this is so, it is useful to review the legislation in some 
detail. 
As the discussion of its predecessor, H.R. 860, indicates, key 
 
860]. 
 121. See id. 
 122. Id. at 39 (Minority Report). 
 123. Id. 
 124. See House Report H.R. 860, supra note 120. 
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provisions of the MPMFJA affect diversity and removal jurisdiction, as 
well as intervention, venue, service of process, and subpoenas.  In 
essence, the Act opens up the federal forum for mass accident cases 
based on state law by exploiting the principle of minimal diversity and 
then by expanding removal jurisdiction and intervention.  The 
amendments to the removal statute especially enable defendants to 
negate a plaintiff’s choice of the state forum.  The Act has been likened 
to a “vacuum cleaner” that can “suck up” all the cases, including state 
proceedings, arising from a mass accident tort.125 
To apply, a single accident must occur in a “discrete location” that 
results in the deaths of at least seventy-five natural persons.126  The 
federal district courts have original jurisdiction in such a situation if 
there is minimal diversity between adverse parties127 and other 
conditions are met.  Significantly and notwithstanding the concerns 
expressed in the debate over H.R. 860, no amount in controversy is 
required.128  Following previous suggestions for multidistrict litigation 
reform, the statute introduces the concept of “residence” as 
significant.129  The presence of minimal diversity provides the bare 
constitutional predicate for jurisdiction under Article III for the 
MPMFJA, but the Act further requires: that a defendant “reside” in one 
state and a “substantial” portion of events takes place in another; that 
two defendants “reside” in different states; or that “substantial” parts of 
the accident take place in different states.130  However, this focus on 
residency does not function as a real limitation on the reach of the statute 
because under the Act a corporation is deemed to reside in any state in 
which it is registered or has a license to do business.131  Thus, most 
corporate defendants will have multiple residences and any of them can 
suffice to activate the MPMFJA.  For example, in a mass tort in which a 
nationwide oil company might be a defendant, so long as one of the 
plaintiffs is a citizen of a state different from the oil company, minimal 
diversity is met and Article III is satisfied.132  Although on these facts at 
 
 125. See Peter Adomeit, The Station Nightclub Fire and Federal Jurisdictional Reach: The 
Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 2002, 25 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 243, 247 
(2003). 
 126. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (West 2003). 
 127. Id. 
 128. 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (West 2003). 
 129. See Rowe & Sibley, supra note 110, at 10-11. 
 130. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (West 2003). 
 131. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(c) (West 2003). 
 132. This follows from the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the requirement of complete 
diversity is congressional, not constitutional.  See State Farm & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 
531 (1967). 
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least one plaintiff must be a citizen of a state different from a defendant, 
the residency requirement will be met easily, as the oil company is a 
“resident” of many (perhaps every) state and one of those states will 
likely be in a different location from the accident.133  By its express 
terms, the statute designates that it is irrelevant whether a defendant is 
also a resident where a substantial portion of the events took place or 
whether defendants with two different residences are also residents of 
the same state.  Unlike the manner in which corporate citizenship 
functions, multiple corporate residences will make it easier to qualify for 
the Act’s grant of subject matter jurisdiction, not harder.  While the 
enlargement of original federal subject matter jurisdiction under 
MPMFJA is novel, the effect the statute has on removal is particularly 
important, for it negates the plaintiff’s forum choice in a way that injects 
uncertainty into the question of when and whether removal will be 
sought. 
Traditionally, removal is parasitic of original subject matter 
jurisdiction, so that one may remove a claim where the plaintiff’s well-
pleaded complaint presents a federal question or where diversity 
jurisdiction would have allowed the plaintiff to file originally in the 
federal forum.134  However, when the plaintiff has chosen to go to a 
defendant’s home state court on a state claim, removal is not 
available.135  The rationale is that the defendant need not typically be 
concerned with achieving a more neutral forum, when the plaintiff has 
submitted to the very state court system from whence the defendant 
hails.136  The MPMFJA dispenses with this limitation so that even where 
plaintiffs have gone to a defendant’s home state court to litigate causes 
of action created by state law, the defendant may still remove to the 
federal forum.137  But, the removal right goes further.  The statute also 
 
 133. As Rowe and Sibley put it: “This situation will always exist if defendants have different 
residences as it will if a defendant has a certain residence and at least part of the acts or omissions 
occurred elsewhere.”  See Rowe & Sibley, supra note 110, at 26-27 (footnotes omitted).  It is 
important to note that the statute retains the standard definition of corporate citizenship for purposes 
of meeting the minimal diversity requirement as the place of incorporation and the principal place of 
business.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1369(c) (West 2003). 
 134. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (West 2003). 
 135. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (West 2003). 
 136. See 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3723, at 
568 (1998). 
 137. Among other things, the Act’s amendments to the removal statute provide: 
(e) (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, a defendant in a 
civil action in a State court may remove the action to the district court of the United 
States for the district and division embracing the place where the action is pending if– 
(A) the action could have been brought in a United States district court under section 
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provides that if a defendant is a party in an existing MPMFJA action (or 
even in an action that is not brought under the Act, but could have been) 
and that defendant is also a party in a state proceeding that arises from 
the “same accident,” the defendant can remove the state court action, 
even if it could not have been brought originally in a federal court on its 
own.138  Apparently this could apply even in the circumstance where 
parties in the state court action are citizens of the same state, because 
upon removal and consolidation with the MPMFJA action, minimal 
diversity would exist, so that Article III’s minimum requirements would 
be met.139  Perhaps this is just a variation on the theme of supplemental 
jurisdiction, but one in which the action that provides the anchor claim 
itself does not satisfy complete diversity.  In this way, the MPMFJA 
does function as a kind of vacuum cleaner and allows the defendant 
tremendous latitude to turn on the switch.  When it is remembered that 
the claims for relief subject to the Act do not all themselves have to be 
claims for death, but can encompass claims for personal injury and 
property damage, the significant expansion of removal jurisdiction that 
this represents becomes more stark. 
The procedure for removal requires intricate coordination with state 
courts.  Unlike traditional removal, the defendants do not have to be 
unanimous in their decision to seek the federal forum–only one 
defendant need petition.140  Perhaps most critically for plaintiffs, the 
time limit for removal is very uncertain as the petition may be filed “at 
any time before trial of the action in State court” so long as it is within 
thirty days of the time when the removing defendant first becomes a 
party to the MPMFJA action.141  Even this limit is not dependable, as the 
federal court has the discretion to allow even later removal.142  One can 
only imagine the kind of strategic lever this gives defendants, who may 
wish to escape state proceedings that are not going well and in which 
 
1369 of the title; or 
(B) the defendant is a party to an action which is or could have been brought, in whole or 
in part, under section 1369 in a United States district court and arises from the same 
accident as the action in State court, even if the action to be removed could not have 
been brought in a district court as an original matter. 
28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1) (West 2003). 
 138. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1)(B) (West 2003). 
 139. The statute provides: “An action removed under this subsection [28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)] 
shall be deemed to be an action under section 1369 [the MPMFJA] and an action in which 
jurisdiction is based on section 1369 of this title.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(5) (West 2003). 
 140. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1) (West 2003) (providing that “a defendant . . . may remove” 
(emphasis added)). 
 141. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1)(B) (West 2003). 
 142. Id. 
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plaintiffs have already invested time and money. 
Once removed to the federal court, the state matter resides there 
until a liability determination has been made.  Thereafter, it is remanded 
to the state court for assessment of damages, unless the federal court 
finds that it should be retained for convenience and justice reasons.143  
The decision to remand to state court is not reviewable “by appeal or 
otherwise.”144  When the matter is removed to the federal court, the court 
may transfer it or dismiss it on grounds of inconvenient forum.145  In 
parallel fashion, the Act also provides a right to intervene in any federal 
action “which is or could have been brought” as an MPMFJA action , 
even if the intervenor could not have brought her claim originally in 
federal court.  Once an action is in federal court on the basis of 28 
U.S.C. § 1369—either originally, on removal, or as an intervenor’s 
claim—the district court must promptly notify the federal MDL panel 
that the action is pending.  This is obviously a requirement to facilitate 
the transformation of an MPMFJA matter into an MDL matter under 28 
U.S.C. § 1407. 
Relaxed subject matter jurisdiction is not the only benefit that the 
MPMFJA brings.  Like the interpleader statute, it allows for liberal 
venue and personal jurisdiction.  The legislation amends the venue 
statute to provide that venue can be had in any district where any one 
defendant resides or where a substantial portion of the events took 
place.146  There is no need that all defendants reside in the same state.  
Following this theme, the Act provides for nationwide and international 
service of process,147 but it goes even further and also authorizes 
nationwide and international service of subpoenas so that witnesses can 
be required to travel long distances to comply with the court’s 
directions.148 
Clearly the MPMFJA imposes heavy burdens on plaintiffs in 
actions subject to its reach and can create real administrative problems 
for state courts that will not be able to predict or effectively manage 
mass accident tort actions filed in their systems given the open-textured 
nature of the removal/remand possibilities.  Perhaps sensitive to the 
encroachment on state prerogatives that it can produce, the Act includes 
 
 143. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(3) (West 2003). 
 144. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(4) (West 2003). 
 145. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(6) (West 2003). 
 146. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(g) (West 2003). 
 147. 28 U.S.C. § 1697 (West 2003). 
 148. 28 U.S.C. § 1785 (West 2003).  The applicant for such a subpoena must show good cause.  
Id. 
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an abstention provision.  Unfortunately, its operation is ambiguous, so 
that no one in the multidistrict drama will be able to predict with 
confidence whether abstention might occur.  The statute directs that a 
federal court “must abstain” from exerting its section 1369 power, if (1) 
“a substantial majority of all plaintiffs are citizens of a single State of 
which the primary defendants are also citizens,” and (2) “the claims 
asserted will be governed primarily by the laws of that State.”149  
Unfortunately the MPMFJA makes no attempt to define “substantial 
majority,” “primary defendants,” or “governed primarily.”150 
What is the impact of the MPMFJA on the democratic values of 
participation, transparency, and accountability?  First and most 
obviously, by redirecting these cases to the federal forum, the 
controversies they involve are farther removed from the reach of local 
political communities, both geographically and conceptually.  As 
Representative Watt pointed out, no longer is the plaintiff simply able to 
walk down the street to the local county court, but she may be required 
to travel significant distances to litigate her claims.151  This physical 
distance problem is only magnified when a mass accident tort, after 
being funneled to the federal forum, is sent to an even more distant 
federal court for coordinated MDL proceedings.  But, it is not just the 
litigants who have a stake in the outcome; the community most affected 
by the mass tort does as well.  By literally “distancing” these 
constituencies from proceedings, federalization limits their participatory 
opportunities.  At a more conceptual level, many of the critical rulings in 
mass accident proceedings will be procedural.  As I have described, 
procedural means for affecting substantive results make participation, 
transparency, and accountability values much more difficult to sustain.  
Procedure is arcane and therefore less accessible to laypersons.  
Procedural rulings made in a distant forum by a federal, not a state, 
judge confuse questions of accountability.  When citizens become aware 
of the possibility that the results in mass accident cases in federal courts 
may vary significantly from those in state proceedings, mobilizing a 
political response will prove more difficult, as the intricate 
legislative/judicial dance bringing it about will be hard to understand.  
But perhaps these consequences are tolerable when balanced against the 
particular and isolated problems of mass accident torts.  When the same 
considerations are applied to class actions, serious questions of 
 
 149. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (West 2003). 
 150. See 28 U.S.C. § 1369(c) (West 2003). 
 151. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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democratic legitimacy arise. 
B.  The Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) 
This issues raised by class action reform on the model of CAFA are 
hotly contested and it is possible that proponents will not be able to 
muster sufficient backing to see the legislation enacted by both houses of 
Congress in the near future.152  Nonetheless support for federal 
legislation controlling class actions is strong in the business 
community.153  For this reason it is unlikely that the technique of using 
the judicial power of the national government to achieve the effect of 
substantive legislation in this area will be jettisoned.  Hence, close study 
of the CAFA is warranted.  To see clearly the policy questions that are at 
stake, I have used S. 274, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, as the 
focus of the discussion because it was the lightening rod for sustained 
policy debate. A revised version of S. 274, S. 2062 is currently pending.  
Its jurisdictional provisions are substantially similar.154 
Doubtless many would be surprised to learn that diversity 
jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution gives Congress 
independent power to regulate interstate commerce (and one the backers 
of the CAFA hope will be resistant to the United States Supreme Court’s 
cases restricting the commerce power under Article I).155  This high wire 
act of an indirect and unregulated commerce power is to be 
accomplished under the CAFA through the concept of an “interstate” 
class action. 
In general, proponents of the CAFA charge that a mere “glitch”156 
in federal diversity jurisdiction—the requirement of complete 
diversity—has allowed the plaintiff’s bar to unfairly “game the system,” 
 
 152. For instance, in October 2003, a motion to invoke cloture in regard to S. 274 failed by one 
vote.  See  72 U.S.L.W.  2476 (February 17, 2004).  In February of 2004, S. 2062, the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2004, was introduced in the Senate. It is the successor legislation to S. 274 and S. 
1751. On February 11, 2004 Senate Majority Leader William Frist delayed consideration of the 
legislation indefinitely due the possibility of unrelated amendments being introduced by Democrats.  
Id.  For a list of bills dealing with the topic of class action fairness and jurisdiction see supra note 5. 
 153. Study and compromise regarding the legislation is still ongoing.  In March 2004, 
Professors Arthur Miller and Samuel Issacharoff met with Senate staff regarding the effect of the 
legislation.  In addition, some senators previously opposed to class action legislation indicate that 
they may support S. 2062, see Senate Staff Confers with Legal Experts on Possible Changes to 
Class Action Bill, 72 U.S.L.W. 2559-60 (March 23, 2004). 
 154. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2004, S. 2062, 108th Cong.  (2004).  One of the primary 
concerns in this legislation is the phenomenon of the coupon settlement. 
 155. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 35. 
 156. The Senate Report actually uses the term “glitch.”  See SENATE REPORT, supra note 35, § 
IV. 
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by filing nationwide class actions in state courts that are then mishandled 
to the detriment of corporate defendants by incompetent or 
overburdened state judges.  Thus, it is plaintiffs’ lawyers who are 
unfairly abusing the current diversity and removal jurisdiction of the 
federal courts.  According to the Senate Majority Report on CAFA, 
these lawyers perpetrate this abuse by joining nondiverse parties so as to 
keep their state-based claims in the state courts.157  The majority finds 
this desire illegitimate, for according to it, diversity jurisdiction itself 
negates the rule that a plaintiff’s choice of forum should carry weight or 
the constitutional principle that, in general, state courts should determine 
claims based on state law. 
Beyond its contested reading of diversity jurisdiction, the CAFA 
redresses a number of specific harms alleged to flow from the current 
system of state class action litigation— that plaintiffs’ lawyers receive 
too much money in fees;158 that “judicial blackmail” by state judges 
forces settlement of “frivolous cases”;159 that the due process rights of 
defendants are being harmed;160 that copycat state class actions arise and 
allow plaintiffs’ attorneys to unfairly shop among state forums;161 that 
inadequate notice and representation to absent class members are 
afforded;162 and that settlements improperly give named class 
representatives a “bounty” or geographically prefer certain class 
members to others.163  In addition, reformers argue that the ability of one 
state to apply its law to determine issues in a nationwide class action 
violates principles of “horizontal” federalism, because it does not respect 
the laws of sister states.164 
 
 157. Of course, just who is playing games is in the eye of the beholder.  The Senate Report has 
nothing to say about the widespread defendant practice of removing state-based actions to the 
federal forum whenever diversity is present, and to go to tremendous lengths to make sure that it is 
present.  Consider, for instance, the litigation strategy of Audi and Volkswagen of America in the 
celebrated personal jurisdiction case, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).  
These defendants spent large amounts of money litigating personal jurisdiction all the way to the 
United States Supreme Court in order to achieve the dismissal of their non-diverse codefendants.  
See id. at 299.  When this strategy worked and the plaintiffs were forced to amend their complaint, 
the remaining defendants removed the action to the federal forum, where they eventually won the 
action on liability. 
 158. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 35, § IV.D.1.  But see FCJ, Attorney Reports, supra note 
3 (raising doubts concerning the difference in class certification in the state and federal courts). 
 159. Id. § IV.D.2. 
 160. Id. § IV.D.3. 
 161. Id. § IV.D.4. 
 162. Id. § IV.D.5. 
 163. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 35, § IV.D.6. 
 164. Id. § IV.E.  However, this too is limited by constitutional principles laid down by the 
Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 834-35 (1985) (holding that the Full 
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The list makes clear that by manipulating the diversity jurisdiction 
of the federal courts, the authors of the CAFA hope to reduce the amount 
of money plaintiffs’ lawyers can earn in state-based cases, to facilitate 
the dismissal of cases they find “frivolous,” and to regulate the terms 
and conditions on which parties may settle.  More globally, the CAFA is 
designed to make it much more difficult for products liability actions 
and mass tort cases to be brought as class actions at all, because the 
legislation specifically requires that the federal standards for class 
certification—an increasingly demanding requirement—be applied to 
them and the bill’s drafters assume that these actions will not be 
certified.165  Critics charge that another motive of the legislation is to 
foreclose any remedy for small consumer claims, and to delay and 
impede state environmental and civil rights litigation through the 
complex and uncertain removal/remand process that the statute 
introduces.166  Just how might these consequences arise?  How does the 
statute work? 
Like the Multiparty Multiforum Jurisdiction Trial Act, the Class 
Action Fairness Act trades on the concept of minimal diversity.  
Amendments to the diversity statute provide that the federal courts have 
original jurisdiction over any civil action in which the amount in 
controversy exceeds $5,000,000, is brought as a “class action,” and in 
which any member of the class of plaintiffs is a citizen different from the 
state of any defendant.167  Abrogating the result in Zahn v. International 
Paper Co.,168 the individual claims of class members may be freely 
aggregated to reach this jurisdictional amount.169  The difference in 
citizenship between any one class member and any defendant, a 
condition likely to exist in almost all class actions, satisfies the bare 
requirements of Article III.  This minimal difference in citizenship taken 
together with the $5,000,000 threshold for the amount in controversy (in 
the original House version only $2,000,000 activated jurisdiction170) 
apparently defines the character of the class action as “interstate,” at 
 
Faith and Credit Clause requires states to interpret the laws of other states in good faith, as those 
laws would be applied by the home state courts). 
 165. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 35, § VII. 
 166. Id. § X. 
 167. CAFA, S. 274, supra note 5, § 4 (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)). 
 168. 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (holding that each plaintiff in a FRCP 23(b) class action lawsuit 
must meet the jurisdictional requirements for standing, including amount in controversy 
requirements and that those who do not must be dismissed from the case).  Zahn was superseded by 
the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (West 2003).  See, e.g., Payne 
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 229 F. Supp. 2d 43, 45 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 169. CAFA, S. 274, supra note 5, § 4. 
 170. See CAFA, H.R. 1115, supra note 5, § 4. 
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least in the eyes of the bill’s advocates.171  Generally, no distinction is 
made between the types of claims being brought—for instance, between 
state consumer protection actions or a toxic tort occurring in one 
location.  Amendments designed to make this distinction were generally 
rejected by the Senate Judiciary Committee.172 
Like the MPMFJA, the CAFA also profoundly changes removal 
jurisdiction.  It provides that any class member, including unnamed 
members, may remove,173 an innovation in light of the practice that the 
named class representative picks the forum.  Any one defendant may 
remove, even if the action has been filed in the defendant’s home 
state.174  The right of removal is unilateral; no consent by any other party 
is required.175  As with the MPMFJA, the time for removal is enlarged 
and made uncertain.  State class actions can be removed before or after 
certification,176 a plaintiff class member may remove anytime within 30 
days of receiving notice of the pending state class action,177 and the one-
year outside time limit on removal is not applicable.178  Removed actions 
that do not meet the jurisdictional requirements are subject to remand, 
although the Majority Committee Report exhorts that when in doubt, 
federal courts should err on the side of finding jurisdiction.179  An order 
remanding a removed action to state court is reviewable by appeal or 
otherwise.180 
 
 171. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 35, § III. 
 172. Id. § II. 
 173. See CAFA, S. 274, supra note 5, § 5 (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b)(2): 
“[a] class action may be removed to a district court of the United States . . . by any plaintiff class 
member who is not a named or representative class member without the consent of all members of 
such class”). 
 174. Id. (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b): “[a] class action may be removed to a 
district court of the United States . . . without regard to whether any defendant is a citizen of the 
State in which the action is brought”). 
 175. Id. (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b)(1): “[a] class action may be removed to 
a district court of the United States . . . by any defendant without the consent of all defendants”). 
 176. CAFA, S. 274, supra note 5, § 5 (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c): “[t]his 
section shall apply to any class action before or after the entry of a class certification order in the 
action”). 
 177. Id. (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(d): “[s]ection 1446 relating to a defendant 
removing a case shall apply to a plaintiff removing a case . . . if a plaintiff class member files notice 
of removal within 30 days after receipt . . . of the initial written notice of the class action”). 
 178. Id. 
 179. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 35, § VI.4 (noting, for example, that “in cases in which it 
is unclear whether ‘the number of members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is less 
than 100,’ a federal court should err in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the matter”). 
 180. See CAFA, S. 274, supra note 5, § 5 (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(e): 
“notwithstanding section 1447(d), an order remanding a class action to the State court from which it 
was removed shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise”). 
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Once a state class action is in federal court either on original 
jurisdiction or removal, the CAFA mandates that it shall be dismissed if 
the federal court determines that the action fails to meet the criteria for 
class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.181  This 
applies despite the fact that the action may already have been certified as 
a class action under state laws.  If an action fails to achieve class 
certification at the federal level, the complaint may be amended and it 
may be filed again as a state class action, but again, it is vulnerable to 
the unilateral removal by any defendant or class member.182 
Some limits on this broad jurisdictional grant have been imposed.  
But critics charge that they are difficult to administer and will inevitably 
delay and unsettle ongoing state litigation to the detriment of plaintiffs.  
If two-thirds or more of the plaintiffs are from the same state as the 
“primary defendants,” if the primary defendants are state actors, or if the 
number of all class members is less than 100, then the grant of 
jurisdiction does not apply and the action may proceed as a state class 
action.183  In contrast, if at least one-third, but less than two-thirds, of 
class members are citizens of a state different from any primary 
defendants, then the federal court has discretion to abstain from asserting 
jurisdiction.184  This discretion is not unfettered, but is subject to definite 
guidelines, and again, in cases of doubt, the drafters exhort the retention 
of jurisdiction.185  These guidelines include whether the claims involve 
matters of national or interstate interest, whether they will be subject to 
the laws of more than one state, the dispersal of citizenship among 
states, and whether the action could be expected to generate 
“copycats.”186  Clearly, standards referring to matters of national interest 
or whether copycat litigation might be anticipated are open-textured.  In 
addition, the CAFA does not fix the moment in time when the numerical 
requisites relative to class membership are to be determined, for the 
abstention provision or generally.  This makes it very difficult for class 
counsel to predict whether a matter filed as a state class action would be 
 
 181. See id. § 4 (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(7)(A): “[a] district court shall 
dismiss any [class action lawsuit] . . . if the court determines the action may not proceed as a class 
action based on a failure to satisfy the prerequisites of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure”). 
 182. See id. (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(7)(B): plaintiffs may file an 
amended class action in Federal or State court, but “any such action filed in State court may be 
removed to the appropriate district court if it is an action of which the district courts of the United 
States have original jurisdiction”). 
 183. See id. (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)). 
 184. See id. (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)). 
 185. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 186. See CAFA, S. 274, supra note 5, § 4 (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)). 
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susceptible to federal jurisdiction in the first place, or to abstention later, 
if removed.  As with the MPMFJA, this introduces a high degree of 
uncertainty into state class action proceedings, and motivates those who 
wish to avoid wasted litigation to file first in federal court.  From a 
practical perspective, the presence of the statute converts all but a few 
state class actions into federal proceedings. 
C.  Alternatives to Intrusion 
Despite the risks to democratic values that enlarging diversity may 
present, defendants’ claims that state class actions expose them to 
unjustified abuses also deserve attention.  One obvious way to take those 
claims seriously is to assess their factual basis.  Several in-depth studies 
of the contested questions about class actions have been conducted by 
the Rand Corporation.187  One comprised a case study of ten consumer 
class actions from 1989 to 1996.188  The results were equivocal and 
depended on a number of preliminary normative questions.  As the 
authors noted: “Without a consensus on what the social utility of damage 
class actions should be, there can be no consensus on how to weigh the 
social benefits of class actions against their costs.”189  Notwithstanding 
this caveat, the results of the study indicate that the claims of tort 
reformers are likely overblown.  For instance, in regard to the notion that 
plaintiffs’ lawyers initiate class actions on their own and 
opportunistically exploit forum possibilities, the authors stated: 
Our case studies of ten class actions tell a more textured tale [than 
anecdotal accounts] of how damage class actions arise.  Class actions 
are complex social dramas.  Plaintiff class action attorneys play a 
crucial role, but so do individual consumers, regulators, journalists, 
and ordinary lawyers.  Defendants’ roles in the litigation vary: They 
contest some suits vigorously, but pursue certification when it appears 
to offer an efficient means of capping liability exposure.  The 
choreography of the litigation is often complicated: Class action 
attorneys seek out jurisdictions where they think their suits will fare 
well, but cases move from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and new actors 
appear and disappear from the stage.  Although lawyers drive the 
drama to its conclusion, it is American society and culture that provide 
the ingredients for the story.190 
 
 187. See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., DILEMMAS, supra note 26, at 5. 
 188. Id. at 140-41. 
 189. Id. at 401-02 (emphasis in original). 
 190. Id. at 402. 
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In fact, the study raised this possibility: “Although public commentary 
frequently depicts damage class actions as plaintiff lawyers’ suits, an 
alternative view is that they are the creatures of defendants’ desires to 
forestall more costly forms of litigation or continued consumer 
complaints.”191  With regard to the question of forum choice in general, 
the study asserted: 
Whether forum choice ought to be constrained in damage class actions 
poses another dilemma for public policymakers.  On the one hand, 
broad forum choice for class action derives from our federal system of 
laws, which has deep historic roots and is a central feature of our 
democratic system of government.  Moreover, the availability of 
multiple fora may sometimes provide access to compensation through 
the courts to consumers who would not otherwise have redress.  
Whether one views this access as good or bad depends, of course, on 
one’s perspective on the merits of using damage class actions for such 
redress.192 
In general, the study suggests that the data is much more nuanced than 
the claims of tort reformers suggest and cannot be disaggregated from 
one’s pre-exiting normative inclinations.  One of the more recent and 
embarrassing studies for those who argue state class actions must be 
reigned in is the study conducted by Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey 
P. Miller.193  Among other things, it shows that the attorneys fees 
awarded to class counsel in federal cases, at least until recently, are 
actually larger on average than those awarded by state courts.194  For 
their part, tort reformers counter with a number of empirical studies and 
anecdotal accounts that they believe do show significant abuses.195  It 
seems unlikely that a resort to empirics alone can resolve the question. 
Even if one were to assume for purposes of argument that many of 
the claims of tort reformers are true, it does not settle the question of 
whether state tort law should be federalized through the back door of 
procedural manipulation.  Because the risks to democratic values may be 
too high, all viable alternatives to transforming diversity jurisdiction 
 
 191. Id. at 407 (emphasis in original). 
 192. HENSLER ET AL., DILEMMAS, supra note 26, at 415-16. 
 193. See Civil Procedure—Class Actions: Study Disputes Rising Attorney Fees, Recoveries in 
Class Action Settlements, 72 U.S.L.W. 2412 (January 20, 2004) (reporting on an examination of the 
results of 370 class action settlements reported for the period 1993-2002). 
 194. Id. 
 195. See LAYCOCK, supra note 46, at 172-73.  See also Manhattan Institute for Policy 
Research, Civil Justice Reports, available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/mi_ 
publications_cont_1.htm#cjr (last visited Apr. 12, 2004) (listing several empirical studies of class 
action lawsuits). 
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should be explored.  In fact, canvassing the list of abuses identified by 
the backers of CAFA reveals it contains items that could be attacked 
directly on the federal constitutional grounds of procedural due process.  
This suggests that if these claims are serious, there is at least one 
alternative to completely reordering federal subject matter jurisdiction—
defendants can directly object to the very due process abuses they allege. 
The United States Supreme Court has long regulated the standards 
of notice and opportunity to be heard that are constitutionally 
required.196  And, even before the modern incarnation of class action 
practice, the Court spoke on the due process implications of inadequate 
representation by named class representatives with the celebrated 
decision of Hansberry v. Lee.197  Another avenue would be to pursue not 
just procedural, but substantive, due process claims.  Obviously state 
laws that violate rights protected by the United States Constitution 
cannot trump those rights.198  If the due process rights of defendants are 
profoundly violated, they might argue that their fundamental rights are 
being infringed or equal protection violated.  In fact, this has been a 
successful campaign in the case of punitive damages.199  Over the last 
decade the United States Supreme Court’s punitive damages 
jurisprudence has changed from one where the only check on state 
practice was procedural due process,200 to one in which a substantive 
right has been conferred on defendants not to be liable for punitive 
damage amounts that are too large.201  This trajectory might prove 
fruitful for other items of damages, especially nonpecuniary damages,202 
 
 196. See Conn. v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991) (providing a multifactorial test for determining 
constitutionally adequate opportunity to be heard); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (among 
other things, construing the constitutionality of notice in class actions); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover 
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (establishing the federal constitutional standard for 
adequate notice of the pendency of an action). 
 197. 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940) (recalling that members of a “class not present as parties to the 
litigation may be bound by the judgment where they are in fact adequately represented by parties 
who are present”); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class 
Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 362-63 (1999). 
 198. This is axiomatic given the Supremacy Clause.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 199. See Robert L. Rabin, Federalism and the Tort System, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 23-25 
(1997). 
 200. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
 201. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 202. This is because many of the arguments used to constitutionalize the issues involved in 
punitive damages have also been made in regard to nonpecuniary compensatory damages, such as 
awards for pain and suffering or mental distress.  The Supreme Court itself recognized these 
similarities.  See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 467-68 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  See also, JoEllen Lind, The End of Trial on Damages? Intangible Losses and 
Comparability Review, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 251, 268 (2003). 
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but it seems much less likely to upset the long-embedded state common-
law principles of tort liability.  And, given the distinction between 
economic rights and other kinds established by United States v. 
Carolene Products,203 as well as the principle that differential effects do 
not establish an intent to discriminate under Washington v. Davis,204 it is 
difficult to see what arguments repeat corporate defendants could use to 
strike neutrally worded state tenets of negligence, products liability, and 
the like as a violation of the federal Constitution.205  In reality, it looks as 
though tort reformers want to have it both ways in regard to state class 
actions—to invoke due process as a reason to reorder state/federal 
relations without having to actually put their due process claims to the 
test. 
John S. Baker, Jr., has suggested another way to address the claims 
of repeat defendants without fundamentally changing the regime of 
diversity jurisdiction.  For him, a serious charge concerning state class 
actions derives from the application of one state’s law to determine a 
defendant’s liability in multiple geographic areas.206  This is the problem 
of conflict of laws in the class action context.  He argues that if the 
limitations on one state’s reach established by Phillips Petroleum v. 
Shutts207 are not sufficient, then under the Full Faith and Credit Clause208 
Congress might have the authority to craft a body of national class action 
rules that could be employed to determine contested conflicts questions 
in state-based, nationwide class proceedings.209 
Leaving aside the questions of conflict of laws, another avenue to 
pursue would be to curb abusive state class actions in the very states 
where the most egregious abuses occur.  In fact some states that have 
been identified as particularly problematic have instituted reforms on 
their own.210  Dramatic reformulations of diversity jurisdiction instituted 
for the purpose of bypassing the states would retard this natural process 
of state self-correction and undercut the very role of the states in the 
 
 203. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 204. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 205. See Baker, supra note 38, at 721. 
 206. Id. at 719, 729-32. 
 207. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
 208. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 209. Baker, supra note 38, at 713. 
 210. For instance, this seems to be what is happening in Louisiana.  See generally Donald C. 
Massey, Louis C. LaCour, Jr., & Valerie M. Sercovich, Curtailing the Tidal Surge: Current 
Reforms in Louisiana Class Action Law, 44 LOY. L. REV. 7 (1998) (profiling state and federal class 
action law with an emphasis on mass tort class actions as a backdrop for analyzing the history of 
Louisiana class action lawsuits and consequent reform efforts in the state). 
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constitutional framework.211 
Finally, if after all these alternatives were exhausted and abuses still 
existed, the nature and extent of the changes need not be as extensive as 
the proponents of the CAFA intend.212  For instance, in a letter dated 
March 26, 2003, to the Senate Judiciary Committee in regard to S. 274, 
the Judicial Conference reiterated its disquiet about the legislation as 
written, out of a concern for its impact on the caseload of the federal 
courts and the effect on state/federal relations.213  As the Conference 
stated: “Congress should be encouraged to include sufficient limitations 
and threshold requirements so that federal courts are not unduly 
burdened and states’ jurisdiction over in-state class actions is left 
undisturbed . . . .”214  A major limitation the Conference suggested was 
based on the type of class action involved; i.e., in the case of consumer 
class actions based on fraud or warranty law, or environmental disasters, 
state courts should have dominance.215  But the interest of proponents in 
these alternatives seems to have waned — they do not primarily bring 
procedural or substantive due process challenges to the basic regime of 
the state common law of torts, they do not wish to explore a national 
body of conflict rules, and they have been unmoved by claims that some 
actions must be retained by the states due to their fundamental local 
character.  Why is this the case?  It is possible that the real goal is to 
curtail mass tort class actions altogether by redirecting them to the 
federal forum where they will be obstructed so profoundly that 
defendants’ overall liability will be reduced.  Tort reformers may not be 
interested in incremental change that preserves the democratic elements 
of federalism if they can limit their liability by procedural means under 
the radar screen of popular will. 
 
 211. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
 212. Recall, this is the rationale for the MPMFJA.  Moreover, the possibility of states 
replicating the federal MDL process in some fashion ought to be considered. 
 213. See Letter from the Judicial Conference to the Senate Judiciary Committee, (Mar. 26, 
2002) (copy on file with author). 
 214. Id. at 1. 
 215. Id. 
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IV.  TILTING THE PLAYING FIELD 
Proponents of tort reform are intentionally harnessing procedure to 
displace state law that they deplore.  Their strategy involves a two-step 
process.  As I have shown, the first step is to redirect litigation into the 
federal forum by way of minimal diversity; the second is to rely on the 
different procedural rules applicable there to produce different 
substantive results.216  Three areas of procedural difference, class action 
certification, summary judgment, and summary judgment substitutes, 
show just how effective this strategy can be. 
A. Class Action Certification 
A strong motive for redirecting state class actions into the federal 
forum is the hope of tort reformers that class certification will be much 
more difficult to achieve there—at least for the purpose of actually 
trying class action controversies.217  The best evidence of this is the 
affirmative requirement in the CAFA itself that the state-based class 
actions must be dismissed if they do not meet the certification 
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23: 
A district court shall dismiss any civil action that is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the court solely under this subsection [28 U.S.C. § 
1369] if the court determines the action may not proceed as a class 
action based on a failure to satisfy the prerequisites of rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.218 
When this mandate is related to the fact that under the new system it is 
possible for a party to seek removal of a state class after it has been 
certified by the state court, the motive becomes even clearer.  These 
features of the legislation are an almost perfect expression of reformers’ 
claim that one of the main “abuses” of state class actions is improper 
certification by state judges.219  The Majority Report of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee on S. 274 shows clearly the majority’s belief that 
there is a link between the procedure governing certification and 
 
 216. See Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). 
 217. As Judith Resnick describes it, “Defendants . . . hope that, were cases channeled to federal 
courts, fewer cases would be certified and fewer settlements approved.”  Resnick, Constricting 
Remedies, supra note 32, at 302.  As John S. Baker, Jr., has noted, proponents of changes in the 
diversity statute seem to assume that class certification will not occur.  See Baker, supra note 38, at 
711. 
 218. CAFA, S. 274, supra note 5, § 4. 
 219. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 35, § VII.2. 
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substantive outcomes: 
Because class actions are such a powerful tool, they can give a class 
attorney unbounded leverage, particularly in jurisdictions that are 
considered plaintiff-friendly.  The reason for this unbounded leverage 
in such jurisdictions is because, as a general rule, the question of 
whether a class is properly certified can only be appealed following a 
costly, and risky, trial.  Thus, the Hobson’s choice is to either settle 
frivolous suits, or invest in expensive litigation.  Consequently, such 
leverage can essentially force corporate defendants to pay ransom to 
class attorneys by settling—rather than litigating—frivolous lawsuits.  
This is a particularly alarming abuse because the class action device is 
intended to be a procedural tool rather than a mechanism that affects 
the substantive outcome of a lawsuit.220 
It is not hard to see that the purpose of the legislation is to employ 
another procedural tool — manipulation of diversity jurisdiction — to 
produce a different substantive outcome.  The CAFA makes the two-step 
maneuver explicit through its goal of opening up diversity jurisdiction 
for the purpose of imposing the federal, not the state, standard for class 
action certification.  As the ability to achieve class certification in the 
federal courts may be increasingly difficult, it is possible that this 
strategy will work.221 
Several factors have come together to affect class action 
certification in the federal forum in particular kinds of cases.  In this era, 
the health consequences of asbestos exposure, tobacco use, mass-
marketed pharmaceuticals and other products have generated the 
phenomenon of the mass tort class action with thousands of potential 
claimants seeking redress for personal injuries.222  Because these actions 
involve common questions concerning defendants’ conduct or products, 
but individual issues concerning the damages of particular class 
 
 220. Id. § IV.D.2 (emphasis added). 
 221. The new Federal Judicial Center study raises questions about how different state and 
federal courts actually are regarding class certification.  See FJC, Attorney Reports, supra note 3. 
 222. See, e.g., Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (asbestos case 
establishing guidelines relating to certifiying a class action for settlement purposed only; 
certification reversed); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740-41 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing 
trial court certification of class action in tobacco litigation action); In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, 
Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prod. Liab. Litig., Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042 (E.D. 
Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (lawsuit involving more than six million class member with potential claims for 
personal injury from taking prescription diet drugs).  Mark Weber has argued in connection with the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Amchem that the real effect of the case is not so much to police 
settlement as to place “a limit on the kinds of cases that may be brought as class actions.”  Mark C. 
Weber, A Consent-Based Approach to Class Action Settlement: Improving Amchem Products, Inc. 
v. Windsor, 50 OH. ST. L.J., 1155, 1177 (1998). 
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members, the lawsuits fall into the most controversial form of class 
action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the  “damage” class 
action under 23(b)(3).223  This type of action is the most difficult to 
certify, as the court must not only find that the basic requisites of 
certification under 23(a) are met,224 but that the common questions of 
law or fact predominate over individual matters and that the class action 
is the superior vehicle for resolving the controversy.225  The 
characteristics of mass tort class actions that have given courts problems 
are the need to individuate damages to class members, the choice of laws 
questions, and increased possibilities of a conflict of interest among 
class members.226 
Although under Federal Rule 23, damage class actions are hardest 
to certify, parties and trial judges often want them to be certified to 
achieve an administrative regime for dealing with thousands of claims 
that would clog the courts if brought individually.  More importantly 
from the defendant’s perspective, they can become means to impose a 
“global settlement” on all class members.227  However, these goals are in 
tension with another set of phenomena—tort reformers and many federal 
judges, particularly at the appellate level, question whether mass torts 
should be brought as class actions at all,228 and they believe that class 
actions in general can lead to unjustified, often collusive, and unfair 
settlements.229  In fact, the attitude of the federal courts toward class 
actions is ambivalent. 
 
 223. In fact, under the pre 1966 revision of Rule 23, such class actions were referred to as 
“spurious” class actions.  See John G. Harkins, Jr., Federal Rule 23—the Early Years, 39 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 705, 708 (1997). 
 224. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (requiring as a prerequisite to certifying a class the existence of 
numerous members that makes joinder impracticable, common questions of law or fact, claims or 
defenses of the representative typical of other members of the class, and representative parties who 
will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class). 
 225. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).  The rule gives four additional factors for the court to consider 
in making these judgments: the interests of the litigations in individually controlling the litigation, 
whether other litigation is already pending, whether the litigation should be concentrated in one 
forum, and the difficulties of class action management.  In addition, the court is instructed to direct 
notice to the members of the class of the right of each member to be excluded on request. 
 226. See, e.g., Castano, 84 F.3d at 740-41; see also Robert L. Rabin, The Third Wave of 
Tobacco Tort Litigation, in REGULATING TOBACCO 187-88 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. 
Sugarman eds., 2001) (analyzing the Fifth Circuit’s Castano decision and its aftermath). 
 227. See Nagareda, supra note 28, at 151-52 (observing that for the settling defendant, the 
purchase of class members’ rights to sue, through claim preclusion, is one of the main purposes of 
defendants). 
 228. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 35.  See also Greer Pagan, Renewed Resistance?: The 
Federal Circuit Courts and the Problem of Mass Tort Class Actions, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 807, 832-41 
(1997). 
 229. Pagan, supra note 228, at 832-41. 
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The history and procedure of federal class actions have been 
extensively analyzed, and it is not my purpose here to go over old 
ground.230  The aims of the modernized class action in the federal courts 
are contested.  Some argue that their core purpose was to facilitate civil 
rights litigation through the injunction class.231  Others argue that a 
motivating force was to provide redress for litigants with claims too 
small to be brought efficiently on an individual basis.232  The rule would 
remedy that problem by allowing small claims to be amassed in a single 
class action providing a controversy of pecuniary significance large 
enough to attract attorney representation and efficient enough through 
economies of scale to justify bringing the action233  But soon after the 
emergence of modern Rule 23 as a result of the 1966 revisions, the 
Supreme Court decided several cases that, ironically, redirected many 
class actions to state forums. 
Under normal principles, class actions based on state causes of 
action must satisfy the regular requirements of diversity, that is, they 
must show complete diversity of citizenship and that the amount in 
controversy is satisfied.  Perhaps surprisingly, the Supreme Court 
established quite early on in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble234 that, 
in litigation having a class action character, only the citizenship of the 
 
 230. See generally, STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE 
MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987) (tracing the development of the class action from early progenitors 
in the Seventeenth Century to its modern form).  See also, Laura J. Hines, Challenging the Issue 
Class Action End-Run, 52 EMORY L.J. 709, 714-17 (2003) (evaluating whether FRCP 23(c)(4)(A) 
should be amended to authorize more innovative issue class actions and placing (c)(4)(A) within the 
entirety of Rule 23); Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the 
Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 686 (1941) (positing that modern society increasingly exposes 
people to group injuries and the problem of fashioning an effective and inclusive group remedy is a 
major issue); Jack B. Weinstein, Some Reflections on the “Abusiveness” of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 
299, 305 (1973) (arguing against a rigid narrowing of FRCP 23 considering that the organized 
character of society affords the possibility of illegal behavior accompanied by wide-spread, diffuse 
consequences, a procedural means should exist to remedy or deter that conduct). 
 231. See Hensler, Revisiting, supra note 27, at 179 (recalling the views expressed by members 
of the 1966 Civil Rules Advisory Committee who amended Rule 23 to facilitate civil rights and 
other class actions aimed at social reform). 
 232. See Bryant Garth, Ilene H. Nagel & S. Jay Plager, The Institution of the Private Attorney 
General: Perspectives from an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 
397 (1988). 
 233. But see Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1420-21 (2003) (arguing that it is defendants who really enjoy economies of 
scale in the mass tort class action). 
 234. 255 U.S. 356 (1921); accord Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1969) (dictum) 
(observing that under current doctrine, “if one member of a class is of diverse citizenship from the 
class’ opponent, and no nondiverse members are named parties, the suit may be brought in federal 
court even though all other members of the class are citizens of the same State as the defendant”). 
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named parties is considered for purposes of diversity of citizenship.235  
But when in the immediate post-1966 revision era the question arose of 
whether class claims could be aggregated, the Court did not take such a 
generous view.  In two cases, it established that class members cannot 
aggregate their individual claims for damages to meet the amount in 
controversy requirement.  Snyder v. Harris236 prohibited aggregation of 
class claims, where none, standing alone, could meet the amount in 
controversy requirement; Zahn v. International Paper Co.237 clarified 
that even if the claim of the named representative(s) met the 
jurisdictional amount, the claims of absent class members could not be 
aggregated with the permitted claim.238  Taken together these decisions 
foreclosed the federal forum for class actions based on an accumulation 
of small individual claims, or even in mass tort situations where smaller 
claims could not be added to larger ones to open the federal forum to the 
whole class.  As a result, the locus of class action activity began to shift 
to the states. 
It was not until the rise of the nationwide, state-based class action, a 
phenomenon facilitated by another important Supreme Court decision, 
Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts,239 that the move to control state class action 
proceedings really got underway.  In an opinion by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, the Court concluded that unnamed class members of a 
plaintiff classs need have no “minimum contacts” with the forum state 
under principles of due process so long as they had sufficient notice, 
adequate representation, the right to participate, and in the case of a 
damages class action, the right to opt-out.240  In so doing, the Court 
sharply contrasted the situation of plaintiff class members from 
defendants—plaintiff members are not generally practically burdened by 
the need to go to a distant forum and actively participate in the litigation, 
and other features of the class action procedure protect their interests, 
things such as the requirement that the named representative be 
adequate, that the court supervises settlement, and the like.241  Thus the 
 
 235. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur, 225 U.S. at 364-66 (reversing a district court opinion that held 
that joinder of a nondiverse party in a class action lawsuit defeated diversity jurisdiction). 
 236. 394 U.S. 332, 336 (1969) (holding that “[w]hen two or more plaintiffs, having separate 
and distinct demands, unite for convenience and economy in a single suit, it is essential that the 
demand of each be of the requisite jurisdictional amount”). 
 237. 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (holding that “[e]ach plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action 
must satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be dismissed from the 
case – ‘one plaintiff may not ride in on another’s coattails’”). 
 238. Id. at 301-02. 
 239. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
 240. Id. at 811. 
 241. Id. at 811-12. 
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Court did not impose a due process requirement that absent class 
members affirmatively “opt-in” to be included in class action litigation.  
However, the Supreme Court did impose limits in the context of choice 
of law, namely that in a nationwide class action, in order for the forum to 
apply its own law, it must “have a ‘significant contact or significant 
aggregation of contacts’” to the class claims to create an interest 
sufficient for the application of its law not to be “arbitrary or unfair.”242  
According to tort reformers, the net result of Shutts was an explosion of 
nationwide class actions for mass torts where state courts were called 
upon to make difficult conflict of laws determinations beyond their 
capabilities.  Moreover, these nationwide classes were portrayed as 
subjecting corporate defendants to frivolous lawsuits and putting them 
under intense pressure to settle — to the detriment of themselves and 
unnamed class members — due to the unjustifiable willingness of state 
judges to certify matters as class actions.  Concern for abusive class 
action settlements and fee arrangements arose in the academy as well, 
and it was not long before calls to revisit the question of mass class 
actions arose and efforts to amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 
were undertaken.243 
In 1998, the first non-technical change to Rule 23 since 1966 took 
effect.  Apparently persuaded by the argument that decisions to grant or 
deny class action certification do indeed spell the death-knell for 
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ relative litigation positions,244 the Advisory 
Committee recommended adding a new subsection (f), granting the 
federal circuit courts discretion to permit an interlocutory appeal from 
the trial court’s decision to grant or deny class action status.245  The 
grant of this new discretionary appellate power appears to be broad: 
The courts of appeals will develop standards for granting review that 
reflect the changing areas of uncertainty in class litigation. . . . 
 
 242. Id. at 821-22.  For general discussions of the personal jurisdiction and conflict-of-laws 
implications of Shutts, see Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an 
Analysis of Opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY L.J. 85 (1997) and Linda S. 
Mullenix, Class Actions, Personal Jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs’ Due Process: Implications for Mass 
Tort Litigation, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 871 (1995). 
 243. For example, the American Law Institute initiated its Complex Litigation Project in 1986.  
See Mullenix, Unfinished Symphony, supra note 110, at 979.  See also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 
COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT (1993).  The first bills addressing the topic of multiparty, 
multiforum mass torts began to be introduced in Congress.  See supra note 115. 
 244. The “death knell” argument was first made in connection with attempts to craft a judge-
made exception to the final judgment rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1292.  See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. 
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).  However, it has been unsuccessful in connection with class 
action certification questions.  See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978). 
 245. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
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Permission to appeal may be granted or denied on the basis of any 
consideration that the court of appeals finds persuasive.  Permission is 
most likely to be granted when the certification decision turns on a 
novel or unsettled question of law, or when, as a practical matter, the 
decision on certification is likely dispositive of the litigation.246 
This new opportunity for interlocutory appeal dovetailed with and 
facilitated an increasing hostility on the part of federal appeals courts to 
class action certification in the damage class actions that were located in 
the federal forum.  The Seventh Circuit’s recent class action 
jurisprudence is particularly revealing.  Prior to the amendment, it 
granted a writ of mandamus to review an order certifying a mass tort 
class action brought on behalf of hemophiliacs who had contracted 
AIDS from infected blood.  Two of the more controversial aspects of the 
decision, In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.,247 were its consideration of 
the merits of the plaintiff’s claim as part of the certification question and 
its arguable defendant bias in assessing the effect of the class action rule: 
“[U]nder the district judge’s plan the thousands of members of the 
plaintiff class will have their rights determined, and the four defendant 
manufacturers will have their duties determined, under a law that is 
merely an amalgam, an averaging, of the nonidentical negligence laws of 
51 jurisdictions.”248  Moreover, throughout the opinion it was clear that 
the court thought little of the plaintiff’s “serendipity” theory of 
negligence.  What was most troubling was the negative attitude the court 
expressed toward damage class actions, an attitude that seemed projected 
from a defense perspective, and not one of neutral concern for both 
sides.  Consider the court’s own words: 
The reason that an appeal will come too late to provide effective relief 
for these defendants is the sheer magnitude of the risk to which the 
class action, in contrast to the individual actions pending or likely, 
exposes them. . . .  They might, therefore, easily be facing $25 billion 
in potential liability (conceivably more), and with it bankruptcy.  They 
may not wish to roll these dice.  That is putting it mildly.  They will be 
under intense pressure to settle. . . .  We do not want to be 
misunderstood as saying that class actions are bad because they place 
pressure on defendants to settle.  That pressure is a reality, but it must 
be balanced against the undoubted benefits of the class action that have 
made it an authorized procedure for employment by federal courts.  
 
 246. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note. 
 247. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 248. Id. at 1302. 
45
Lind: "Procedural Swift"
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004
LIND2.DOC 5/28/2004  11:35 AM 
762 AKRON LAW REVIEW [37:717 
We have yet to consider the balance.249 
The decision has little to say about the practical consequences on the 
unnamed class members who were left with the choice to proceed with 
individual actions or cease litigating at all.  It is not unreasonable to 
assume that given their health condition, many simply gave up due to 
scarce resources and time constraints.  If this is possible, then the court’s 
refusal to sustain class certification had real cash value to the defendant.  
It is hard not to conclude that by its approach to the certification 
question—a procedural matter—the court intentionally affected the 
substantive outcome in the case.  As one commentator notes, 
“[o]bviously, the procedural rules affect the outcome of litigation.  These 
Circuit Courts [including the Seventh Circuit] seemed to ignore the 
essence of Rule 23 because of their philosophical disagreement with the 
effects of Rule 23.”250 
The Seventh Circuit has continued to consider the merits of 
plaintiffs’ claims when reviewing class action certification, and it has 
developed the doctrine that even where the certification decision does 
not appear erroneous, it is entitled to grant interlocutory appeals in order 
to advance the general federal law governing class action practice.251  
The Seventh Circuit’s recent decisions show a pattern of routinely 
reversing class action certification in mass tort litigation and what 
commentators have characterized an animus toward the class action 
device itself.252  The Seventh Circuit is not alone.  Class action 
certification has been reversed in numerous significant proceedings 
involving tobacco, asbestos, pharmaceuticals, and other matters.253  This 
trend should only continue as a result of the most recent amendments to 
Rule 23, amendments which institute the most significant change in the 
nature of the rule since it was modernized in 1966. 
Although the changes to Rule 23 have been described as “balanced 
and neutral,”254 commentators also acknowledge that the revisions “may 
prove to be more ground-breaking than they first appear,”255 and that 
 
 249. Id. at 1297-99 (citations omitted). 
 250. See Cabraser 2002, supra note 3, at 1223. 
 251. See Blair v. Equifax Check Serv., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 252. See Cabraser 2002 supra note 3, at 1239 (commenting on In re Bridgestone/Firestone 
Products Liability Litigation, 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
 253. See, e.g., supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
 254. See Joshua B. Gray and Michelle H. Seagull, Class Action Reaction: Amended Rule 23 
Enhances Judicial Supervision in Class Litigation, 18 SPG-ANTITRU 91, 91 (2004).  The claim is 
also made that Rule 23 as amended does not really change matters, because it incorporates what 
courts are already doing, i.e., “it appears to embody good practices.” Id. 
 255. Id. 
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they “present significant new tactical choices for class action litigants 
and new case management options for courts.”256  Hence, the 2003 
amendments to Rule 23 may signal a sea-change in class action practice.  
The changes are of three major types.  First, they underscore the 
importance of the certification decision itself and create a chronological 
space for the infiltration of merits considerations into that decision.  As 
the Advisory Committee Note states: 
Although an evaluation of the probable outcome on the merits is not 
properly part of the certification decision, discovery in aid of the 
certification decision often includes information required to identify 
the nature of the issues that actually will be presented at trial.  In this 
sense it is appropriate to conduct controlled discovery into the 
“merits,” limited to those aspects relevant to making the certification 
decision on an informed basis.257 
Moreover, the trial court no longer has the discretion to conditionally 
certify a class action, but must refuse certification if there is any doubt 
whether the Rule 23 requirements are met.258 
Second, the rule contemplates that courts exert much more control 
over settlement, and it makes the settlement process in 23(b)(3) damage 
classes uncertain, as it gives unnamed class members a post-settlement 
possibility to opt-out.259  While some aspects of settlement will be 
subjected to greater rigor, others will not.  Significantly, the amended 
rule does not require court supervision where there is settlement of 
individual claims in a class action that is not yet certified.260  This 
reverses the law of most circuits.  This is curious, given the concern of 
tort reformers, academics, and the Advisory Committee itself for 
“collusive” settlements between preferred class members and 
defendants.261  Nonetheless, in regard to certified class actions, the court 
must make findings that any settlement approved is “fair, reasonable, 
 
 256. Id. 
 257. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1) advisory committee’s note; see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION, supra note 109, §§ 21.213, 30.11, 30.12 (discussing the requirement that a party 
requesting class certification prepare a trial plan describing the issues likely to be presented at trial 
and tests whether the issues are susceptible to class-wide proof). 
 258. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C) advisory committee’s note. 
 259. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).  The opt-out option is discretionary with the court, not mandatory.  
See Julie B. Strickland and Stephen J. Newman, Recent Developments in Consumer Class Action 
Litigation, 1414 PLI, CORP 9, 16-7 (2004). 
 260. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note; see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION, supra note 109, § 30.41. 
 261. See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text. 
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and adequate.”262  The Advisory Committee also notes that settlement 
may provide another opportunity to revisit the issue of the class 
definition and may require additional notice.263  In general, the revisions 
inject uncertainty about notice and may increase notice burdens for 
23(b)(3) classes.264 
Finally, the rule attempts to control the questions of legal 
representation and attorneys’ fees by introducing new provisions that 
cede greater managerial power to courts over the question of who shall 
become class counsel and what and how counsel may be paid.265  This 
may reflect what courts are already doing in practice, but the explicit 
grant of managerial authority is significant.  The Advisory Committee 
states: 
This subdivision [new 23(g)] recognizes the importance of class 
counsel, states the obligation to represent the interests of the class, and 
provides a framework for selection of class counsel . . . . The new 
subdivision also provides a method by which the court may make 
directions from the outset about the potential fee award to class 
counsel in the event the action is successful.266 
Carrying on this theme, new subsection (h) provides the court with 
explicit directions as to its role in supervising the award of attorneys 
fees.  The Advisory Committee purports to be taking the law as it finds it 
regarding the award of attorneys fees, but consider these remarks: 
In many instances, the court may need to proceed with care in 
assessing the value conferred on class members.  Settlement regimes 
that provide for future payments, for example, may not result in 
significant actual payments to class members.  In this connection, the 
court may need to scrutinize the manner and operation of any 
applicable claims procedure.  In some cases, it may be appropriate to 
defer some portion of the fee award until actual payouts to class 
members are known.  Settlements involving nonmonetary provisions 
for class members also deserve careful scrutiny to ensure that these 
 
 262. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(C) advisory committee’s notes.  The advisory committee notes 
state that the standards for this determination are to be gleaned from In re: Prudential Insurance Co. 
of America Sales Practice Litigation, 148 F.3d 283, 316-24 (3d Cir. 1998) and the Manual for 
Complex Litigation.  Id. 
 263. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(C) advisory committee’s notes. 
 264. See John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.1419, 
1435-6 (2003) (characterizing the current class action member notice rules as flawed for allowing 
judges the discretion to dispense with class notification in some categorical instances while insisting 
on individual notice in other categories of cases). 
 265. FED R. CIV. P. 23(g). 
 266. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) advisory committee’s note. 
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provisions have actual value to the class.267 
It seems obvious that with its emphasis on certification and 
reducing attorney autonomy in regard to settlement and fees, the 
revisions of Rule 23 will have a differential impact on plaintiffs.  Many 
of the revisions bear uncanny witness to the “abuses” retailed by the 
proponents of the Class Action Fairness Act, and in fact, they lobbied 
the Judicial Conference in regard to the proposed changes in Rule 23 as 
well as the Act itself.268  Coupled with the broad discretion invested in 
the federal courts of appeals since 1998 to review certification decisions 
and their frequent refusal to affirm certification, it is no wonder that the 
proponents of CAFA insist that state-based class actions “shall be 
dismissed” if they fail to achieve certification under Rule 23.  But this is 
apparently not enough for tort reformers.  CAFA itself regulates federal 
class action practice in a way that goes beyond, or even conflicts, with 
Rule 23.  Among its other features, this legislation demands particular 
scrutiny by federal courts over coupon or other noncash settlements, any 
settlement that would result in a net loss to class members after payment 
of counsel fees, and it affirmatively prohibits “bounty” payments to 
named representatives or differential payments to certain class members 
on the basis of geography.269 
In addition to these requirements, the CAFA prescribes in detail a 
particular form of notice that must be given to absent class members.270  
Significantly, it requires that notice be given to state and federal officials 
of the pendency of the class action, so that these officials might 
intervene, if desired, to police the fairness of the proceeding.271  From 
the perspective of a state’s power, this might represent the worst of all 
possible worlds—a constant redirection of class action litigation from 
one’s state courts to the federal forum, with a concomitant need to 
monitor and intervene in cases in that forum.  The drafters of the CAFA 
attempt to minimize the conflict between state and federal law by 
arguing that most states have adopted some version of Federal Rule of 
 
 267. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) advisory committee’s note.  But see Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 
U.S. 87, 95 (1989) (recognizing that in some class action lawsuits the monetary relief obtained is 
not the sole determinant of an appropriate attorney fee). 
 268. See Resnick, Constricting Remedies, supra note 32, at 298 (noting that in 2002 a “group 
of lobbyists tried to persuade the Judicial Conference to join efforts to convince Congress to divest 
state courts of jurisdiction over class actions, arising under state law, but involving large sums of 
money and defendants doing business on a national scale”). 
 269. See CAFA, S. 274, supra note 5, § 3 (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1712 – 
1715). 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1717). 
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Civil Procedure 23 and so should be following the federal standard,272 or 
that whenever a federal court denies class certification it is likely doing 
so on due process grounds, so that a state’s disagreement as to 
certifiability impliedly violates constitutional principles.273 
B.  Of Summary Judgment 
The technique of redirecting whole categories of state-based 
litigation into the federal forum must be placed in a broader context—
the context of the increasing anti-plaintiff impact of federal procedural 
principles across the board.  What has happened with mass accident torts 
and what may happen to state-based class actions are just extreme 
examples of a more insidious process—the steady erosion of state 
substantive law through federal procedure even in normal diversity 
cases.  Perhaps the most significant procedural benefit offered by the 
federal forum is the substantially greater possibility a defendant will win 
on summary judgment when a case is situated in the federal courts. 
In general, the rationale for summary judgment is to eliminate 
controversies that are not trialworthy.  Where the material facts are not 
in dispute, so that the trier of fact need not decide them, a summary 
procedure for determining the outcome is appropriate and does not 
violate the right to jury trial.274  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, 
which provides for summary judgment in the federal courts, was part of 
the original package of federal rules enacted in 1938.275  The 1963 
amendments to Rule 56 theoretically increased the burden on parties 
opposing summary judgment because it prohibited the nonmoving party 
from relying on the pleadings alone, and required the nonmovant instead 
to muster evidence beyond the pleadings gleaned from discovery or 
opposing affidavits.276  If this burden is not met, then summary judgment 
“shall be rendered forthwith.”277  The 1963 change raised a number of 
questions—what showing the moving party would have to make to shift 
the burden of production, how burdens of proof should affect summary 
judgment, and what standards a court should use in evaluating evidence 
 
 272. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 35. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See Martin B. Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE 
L. J. 745, 747 (1974) (exploring the principal function of the motion for summary judgment). 
 275. See Georgene M. Vairo, Through the Prism: Summary Judgment After the Trilogies, in 
Civil Practice and Litigation Techniques in Federal and State Courts, SH063 ALI-ABA 577, 583 
(2003) [hereinafter Vairo, Trilogies]. 
 276. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
 277. Id. 
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mustered by the nonmovant to avoid summary judgment.  It is also 
important for understanding the dynamics to note that materials in 
affidavits must be based on personal knowledge and set forth facts that 
would be admissible at trial;278 thus, the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
particularly the hearsay doctrine, can come into play when determining 
whether a nonmovant has met the burden of producing new materials 
showing that the case is trialworthy. 
The requirements imposed by Rule 56(c) for successfully opposing 
a motion for summary judgment fall more heavily on plaintiffs because 
they typically bear the burden of proof.279  Moreover, there are particular 
kinds of cases where fulfilling the mandate of 56(c) can be difficult, 
even when the plaintiff’s claim has merit.  For instance, where a case is 
based on circumstantial evidence and no eyewitnesses are available, it is 
challenging for plaintiffs to oppose summary judgment.  When potential 
witnesses do not cooperate to provide nonhearsay affidavits, the 
evidence needed to oppose a motion can be difficult to obtain.280  In 
products liability cases, one key piece of establishing liability is product 
identification—the plaintiff must show that it is the particular 
defendant’s product that has injured her.  If the defendant controls access 
to the information needed for product identification, and the defendant is 
not forthcoming in discovery, the plaintiff may be unable to get to 
evidence to oppose the motion.281  In less sinister circumstances, where 
records and memories have diminished with time, the one with the 
burden of producing them will inevitably lose on summary judgment.282  
Finally, when the theory of liability depends for causation on difficult 
inferences from statistical information, increasing hostility in the federal 
courts to so called “junk science”283 may make it impossible for a 
plaintiff to survive a defense motion for summary judgment. 
 
 278. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f). 
 279. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary 
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 81 (1990) [hereinafter Issacharoff & Loewenstein, Second Thoughts]. 
 280. This may have been a reason why the plaintiff in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 
142, 159-61 (1970), an early civil rights case concerned with desegregation of a lunch counter, 
found it difficult to provide standard counter-affidavits. 
 281. In this context, consider the stance of the defendants.  See, e.g., Andrew J. McClurg, A 
Thousand Words are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 
NW. U. L. REV. 63, 99 n. 231 (2003) (recalling the evidentiary stonewalling on the part of the 
tobacco industry in the Minnesota tobacco litigation). 
 282. This was a key problem in Celotex itself.  See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 
(1986). 
 283. Daniel Riesel, Scientific Proof and Examination of Experts in Environmental Litigation, 
SH093 ALI-ABA 383, 415 (2003) (analyzing recent Supreme Court decisions relating to the 
admission of expert testimony) [hereinafter Riesel, Scientific Proof]. 
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In 1986 the United States Supreme Court decided three watershed 
cases (sometimes referred to as the “trilogy”) governing summary 
judgment practice in the federal courts.  These cases made it much easier 
for defendants to secure victory through the summary judgment 
procedure.284  While it is standard doctrine that on summary judgment, 
the trial court is not supposed to weigh evidence–a function reserved to 
the trier of fact, the Supreme Court eroded that principle though its 
holding in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.285  There the Court stated 
that, “[a] ruling on a motion for summary judgment . . . necessarily 
implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply 
at the trial on the merits.”286  Because the cause of action at issue there 
required the plaintiff to establish that the defendant acted with malice 
under the “clear and convincing” standard of proof, a trial court would 
be authorized to grant summary judgment if, in its opinion, the counter-
affidavits of the plaintiff did not rise to the level of evidence required.287  
Matsushita Electric Industries, Co. v. Zenith Radio288 further obscured 
the proper role of the trial judge when assessing the effectiveness of a 
plaintiff’s counterevidence, for it introduced the wild card of motive.  
There the Supreme Court argued that summary judgment was improper, 
because it believed the defendant had no motive to do what the plaintiff 
alleged: “[L]ack of motive bears on the range of permissible conclusions 
that might be drawn from ambiguous evidence.”289  From the perspective 
of the plaintiff’s fortunes on summary judgment in the federal forum, 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,290 has proved the most problematic, for when 
read expansively, it obviates the necessity that a defendant who moves 
 
 284. As Georgene M. Vairo describes it: 
During the Spring and Summer of 1986, the Supreme Court decided three summary 
judgment cases: Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett; and 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.  Unquestionably, these cases 
had a significant impact on federal practice.  In some respects, this trilogy represents a 
radical departure from past summary judgment practice under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56 (“Rule 56”).  The decisions clearly advocate more liberal use of summary 
judgment and thus provide a more hospitable climate for bringing summary judgment 
motions. 
Vairo, supra note 275, at 577 (citations omitted).  But see generally Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on 
Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV 
770 (1988) (arguing that an increased willingness to dispense with cases on summary judgment 
signaled by the trilogy is appropriate). 
 285. 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
 286. Id. at 252. 
 287. Id. 
 288. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 289. Id. at 596. 
 290. 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
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for judgment present any affirmative evidence that the plaintiff cannot 
demonstrate a triable issue of fact.  According to the Celotex plurality,291 
it is enough that the defendant merely points out—albeit by referring to 
pleadings, discovery, and other materials—that the plaintiff cannot 
establish an element of a claim.  Thus, the defendant need not provide 
affidavits in support of its motion to shift the burden to the nonmoving 
party.  In cases where access to evidence is difficult because it is 
circumstantial, witnesses are reluctant, the defendant controls it, 
significant time has passed, or statistical proof is controversial, federal 
courts are prone to grant summary judgment. 
The principles of Anderson, Matsushita, and Celotex, though 
couched in the language of procedure, have a definite and substantive 
policy impact.  Overall they tend to prevent plaintiffs in certain kinds of 
cases, often tort actions based on state law, from getting to a jury to 
prove liability.292  It is possible that numerous defendants who should be 
liable to these plaintiffs are not held to be, given the procedural barriers 
imposed by the federal version of summary judgment.  Most importantly 
for state-federal relations and the Erie doctrine, the net result is to make 
it much more likely that a defendant in federal court will obtain 
summary judgment than a defendant in state court.  This becomes a 
powerful motive for defendant forum-shopping and another reason why 
tort reformers want to redirect tort litigation to the federal forum.  Why 
should this be the case?  Because many states, fully cognizant of the 
policy implications of Anderson, Matsushita, and Celotex, do not follow 
them. 
For instance, state court decisions in California,293 Indiana,294 
Kentucky,295 Florida,296 Oklahoma,297 Oregon,298 and Texas299 repudiate 
 
 291. Id. at 322-23.  Although Celotex was a plurality opinion, its gravitational pull has 
decidedly changed the burdens previously allocated on summary judgment.  See Issacharoff & 
Loewenstein, Second Thoughts, supra note 279, at 79-84. 
 292. Jeffrey W. Stempel argues that their net result is to change the relative power of the 
litigants in the federal courts.  See Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s 
Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 95, 159-62 (1988). 
 293. Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C., 89 Cal. App. 4th 164, 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) 
(observing that “[u]nder the practice prevailing in the federal district courts since 1986, a defendant 
moving for summary judgment is not required to present any evidence in support of the motion. . . . 
a like rule does not appear ever to have prevailed under the California summary judgment statute”), 
review denied, 2001 Cal. LEXIS 5986 (Cal. 2001). 
 294. Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers, 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind. 1994) (observing that 
“Indiana’s summary judgment procedure abruptly diverges from federal summary judgment 
practice.  Under the federal rule, the party seeking summary judgment is not required to negate an 
opponent’s claim. . . .  Indiana does not adhere to Celotex and the federal methodology”). 
 295. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Ky. 1991) (observing 
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the holding in Celotex and require that before a defendant can shift the 
burden of production to the plaintiff to avoid summary judgment, the 
defendant must come forward with affirmative evidence of its own 
showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists.  Moreover, 
decisions in California,300 Georgia,301 Illinois,302 Ohio,303 and Rhode 
Island304 have either distinguished or refused to extend Celotex.  
Similarly, Alaska,305 Florida,306 Indiana,307 Kentucky,308 New Jersey,309 
New Mexico,310 Oregon,311 Texas,312 and Wyoming313 decline to follow 
Anderson, and opinions from Kentucky,314 Michigan,315 and Oregon316 
disapprove of Matsushita.  Collectively, these variations establish an 
approach to summary judgment in state jurisdictions that is significantly 
different from the federal approach.  And, the ability to obtain a higher 
 
that Kentucky courts “generally have cited and followed the decision in Paintsville Hospital Co. v. 
Rose, Ky., 683 S.W.2d 255 (1985), which set the standard for summary judgment in this state and is 
a standard which is clearly at variance with those declared in [the trilogy]”). 
 296. 5G’s Car Sales, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Law Enforcement, 581 So. 2d 212, 212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1991) (holding that although the lower court’s “judgment was plainly erroneous under any 
standard, including Celotex [and progeny], it should be emphasized that, to the extent that they tend 
to loosen the restrictions on the use of summary judgment, these cases. . . . do not represent the law 
of Florida on the issue”). 
 297. Kating v. City of Prior, 977 P.2d 1142, 1144 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998) (observing that “the 
federal summary judgment standards established in Celotex—a case cited by City—and other 
related federal cases are not specifically applicable in Oklahoma appellate review of summary 
judgments”). 
 298. Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 939 P.2d 608, 615-17 (Or. 1997) (rejecting the argument that 
Celotex and progeny should affect the interpretation of Oregon’s summary judgment statute). 
 299. Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 555-56 (Tex. 1989) (observing that “summary 
judgments in federal courts are based on different assumptions, with different purposes, than 
summary judgments in Texas. . . . Texas law, of course, is different.  While the language of our rule 
is similar [to the federal summary judgment rule], our interpretation of that language is not”). 
 300. Union Bank v. Super. Ct., 31 Cal. App. 4th 573, 590-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
 301. First Nat’l Bank v. J. Reisbaum Co., 378 S.E.2d 317 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). 
 302. Ganci v. Washington, 745 N.E.2d 42 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
 303. Mitseff v. Wheeler, 526 N.E.2d 798 (Ohio 1988). 
 304. DiBatista v. State, 808 A.2d 1081, 1090 (R.I. 2002). 
 305. Moffatt v. Brown, 751 P.2d 939, 942-44 (Alaska 1988). 
 306. 5G’s Car Sales, Inc., 581 So. 2d at 212. 
 307. Chester v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 553 N.E.2d 137, 141 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). 
 308. Steelvest, Inc., 807 S.W.2d at 479. 
 309. DePrimo v. Lehn & Fink Products Co., 538 A.2d 461, 463 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1987). 
 310. Bartlett v. Mirabal, 999 P.2d 1062 (N.M. App. 2000). 
 311. Jones, 939 P.2d at 615. 
 312. Casso, 776 S.W.2d at 555-56. 
 313. Parker v. Haller, 751 P.2d 372, 376-77 (Wyo. 1988). 
 314. Steelvest, Inc., 807 S.W.2d at 479. 
 315. People v. Katt, 662 N.W.2d 12 (Mich. 2003). 
 316. Jones, 939 P.2d at 615. 
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incidence of victories on summary judgment in one system will have an 
indirect impact on substantive policy choices concerning tort liability in 
another.  Just using one state jurisdiction—Oregon—is instructive.  It 
rejects all three decisions in the federal trilogy, so that a defendant 
moving for summary judgment cannot carry its burden of production 
without affirmative evidence (Celotex), burdens of proof do not raise the 
risk that judges will improperly weigh the sufficiency of evidence on 
summary judgment (Anderson), and plaintiff affidavits are not 
discounted by way of the elusive standard of defendant motive 
(Matsushita).  Presumably, it is more difficult to keep a case from the 
jury in Oregon state proceedings.  Yet if a cause of action based on 
Oregon law can be redirected to the federal forum, it is possible that the 
defendant’s chances of achieving summary judgment increase 
significantly.  Being merely “procedural,” the tenets of Celotex, 
Anderson, and Matsushita trump Oregon state practice, and we are 
invited to ignore the impact they might have on the policy choices made 
by Oregon political majorities concerning tort liability.  When this 
possibility is related to the democratic principles of participation, 
transparency, and accountability, the stakes involved in enlarging 
diversity jurisdiction are uncovered. 
C.  Summary Judgment Substitutes 
The difference in summary judgment between the state and federal 
systems is not difficult to detect; however, federal courts are developing 
additional procedures that are functional equivalents of summary 
judgment, but of a more stealthy kind.  Again, procedural innovation is 
being deployed to manufacture particular outcomes, but in an attenuated 
fashion that further insulates what is happening from the attention of 
democratic majorities by another layer of process.  These procedures can 
be conceived as “summary judgment substitutes”317 and the best 
example of the phenomenon is the “Daubert hearing,” under which a 
litigant’s potential to rely on expert testimony to stave off summary 
judgment can be foreclosed in advance.  Again, given burdens of proof, 
this procedure typically functions to disadvantage plaintiffs, not 
defendants, and it does so especially in cases where the plaintiff needs to 
use statistical inference via expert opinion to establish causation. 
To place Daubert hearings in context, it is important to remember 
that the Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) govern in all cases located in 
 
 317. The concept of “summary judgment substitutes” is attributable to my colleague Ivan 
Bodensteiner who suggested the idea to me in conversation about this article. 
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the federal forum, whether those cases are based on state law or not.318  
Another way of putting this is that the FRE generally have the same 
status as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure under the Erie/Hanna 
regime—they are treated as rules of procedure not substance, so that 
they control over conflicting state evidence rules.  In 1993 the Supreme 
Court ushered in a new era regarding the use of expert scientific 
evidence with its opinion, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.319  Daubert increased the power of federal trial judges to exclude 
relevant expert testimony by investing them with a “gatekeeper” 
function to determine when proffered scientific proof was not reliable 
enough to be considered by the trier of fact, usually a jury.320  Rather 
than directing the jury to consider expert testimony and allowing it to 
measure reliability to determine evidentiary weight, Daubert allows the 
trial judge to exclude the material altogether.321  The trial judge’s 
determination is reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion 
standard.322  It did not take long for defendants to waken to the potential 
impact of Daubert on summary judgment. 
Where liability in a proceeding turns on the opinions of conflicting 
experts, summary judgment would normally be precluded as a defense 
option because the very conflict in the experts’ opinions would present a 
triable issue of fact for a jury to resolve.  However, if the plaintiff’s 
experts’ opinions can be excluded, this removes a lynchpin source the 
plaintiff can use to oppose summary judgment.  The purpose of the 
Daubert hearing is to attack the admissibility of expert evidence in 
advance of trial and strategically position a party—usually the 
defendant—to move for summary judgment.  It has become 
commonplace for federal courts to conduct a “Daubert hearing” to test 
the admissibility of plaintiffs’ crucial expert opinions early on in 
litigation;323 when the evidence is ruled inadmissible—a frequent 
phenomenon—a successful defense motion for summary judgment 
 
 318. This was actually quite controversial in regard to evidentiary privileges.  See Ely, Myth, 
supra note 85, at 693-96. 
 319. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  In fact, FRE 702 was amended to conform with Daubert.  See FED. 
R. EVID. 702 (establishing the preconditions for admissibility of expert testimony).  Companion 
cases extending and refining the basic principle of Daubert are General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 
U.S. 136, 138 (1997) (establishing abuse of discretion as the standard of review) and Kumho Tire 
Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (extending Daubert to all expert testimony). 
 320. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-593. 
 321. See Development in the Law—Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 
108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1488-89 (1995).  See also Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412, 
417 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 322. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 138-39. 
 323. See Riesel, Scientific Proof, supra note 283, at 411. 
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typically follows.324  As one commentator has noted, the application of 
Daubert325 “has resulted in the exclusion of many more experts than it 
has admitted.” 
As with the rules in Anderson, Celotex, and Matsushita, a 
substantial number of states do not follow Daubert.  Cases from 
Alabama,326 Arizona,327 California,328 Colorado,329 Georgia,330 Florida,331 
Illinois,332 Kansas,333 Michigan,334 Mississippi,335 Missouri,336 
Minnesota,337 New Jersey,338 New York,339 Nevada,340 South Carolina,341 
Tennessee, 342 Washington,343and Wisconsin344 have repudiated Daubert 
or limited its application.  The reasons for their reluctance are complex 
and involve not only policy considerations involving civil matters, but 
criminal ones as well.  In regard to civil cases, the Arizona Supreme 
Court stated concerning Daubert and its progeny: 
One of the arguments for adopting Daubert is to allow trial judges to 
put a halt to improper verdicts from jurors misled by junk science and 
experts ready at the drop of a hat (or a dollar) to say anything for any 
party.  This, of course, a two-edged sword—plaintiffs’ lawyers do not 
have a monopoly on venal or inaccurate experts.  But we do not 
believe that Daubert/Kumho to be a perfect or even a good antidote.  
Implicit in Joiner and Kumho is the assumption that trial judges as a 
 
 324. See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” 
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1104 n.623 (2003) [hereinafter Miller]. 
 325. See Reisel, supra note 283, at 420, 420 n. 29. 
 326. Courtaulds Fibers, Inc. v. Long, 779 So. 2d 198, 202 (Ala. 2000) (holding that Alabama 
courts have not “abandoned the ‘general acceptance’ test stated in [Frye], and it has not adopted the 
Daubert standard in civil cases”). 
 327. Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 124-33 (Ariz. 2000). 
 328. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 337 (Cal. 1994). 
 329. Lindsay v. People, 892 P.2d 281, 288 (Colo. 1995), overruled by People v. Shreck, 22 
P.3d 68 (Colo. 2001) . 
 330. Norfolk S. Ry. v. Baker, 514 S.E.2d 448, 451 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). 
 331. Spann v. State, 857 So. 2d 845, 852 (Fla. 2003). 
 332. People v. Dalcallo, 669 N.E.2d 378, 382 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). 
 333. Armstrong v. City of Wichita, 907 P.2d 923, 929 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995). 
 334. Lacasse v. Lacasse, No. 207639, 1998 WL 1988763 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 1998). 
 335. Watkins v. U-Haul Intern, Inc., 770 So. 2d 970, 974 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). 
 336. Bailey v. Cameron Mut. Ins. Co., 122 S.W.3d 599, 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). 
 337. State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38, 46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
 338. State v. Doriguzzi, 760 A.2d 336, 340-41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000). 
 339. People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 454-55 (N.Y. 1994). 
 340. Krause, Inc. v. Little, 34 P.3d 566, 569 (Nev. 2001). 
 341. Moriarty v. Garden Sanctuary Church of God, 534 S.E.2d 672, 677-78 (S.C. 2000). 
 342. Coe v. State, 17 S.W.3d 193, 226-30 (Tenn. 2000). 
 343. State v. Cannon, 922 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Wash. 1996). 
 344. Anderson v. Combustion Eng’g Inc., 647 N.W.2d 460, 462-63 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). 
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group will be more able than jurors to tell good science from junk, true 
scientists from charlatans, truthful experts from liars, and venal from 
objective experts.  But most judges like most jurors, have little or no 
technical training . . . .345 
From the perspective of the Arizona Supreme Court, whether or not to 
adopt Daubert and its companion cases represented a definite policy 
choice concerning its effect on plaintiffs and juries.  But, if the same 
controversy were funneled to the federal court, Daubert would be 
applicable and the availability of a pre-summary judgment, pre-trial 
hearing designed to remove the plaintiff’s experts would be available.  It 
is not surprising that many commentators conclude the outcome of a 
Daubert hearing determines the outcome of a case.346  The analysis 
comes full circle when the impact of Daubert hearings is related back to 
the continuing trend of considering the merits on class certification.  
When a defendant succeeds in removing a state-based class action to the 
federal court, either under normal principles or the floodgate to be 
opened by the CAFA, the defendant will have a high probability of 
achieving the effect of summary judgment through a strategic use of 
class certification in conjunction with Daubert considerations. 
According to commentators, an increasing number of federal courts 
apply Daubert to the question of whether a class action should be 
certified, as parties utilize experts in aid of the class action 
determination.347  So far the results have been uneven.  For instance, in 
Sanneman v. Chrysler Corporation348 a Daubert-style inquiry resulted in 
the plaintiff classes’ failure to satisfy the predominance test required by 
23(b)(3), because the experts could not agree on the causes of the 
complained damages.349  On the other hand, in McNamara v. Re-X 
Minerals Ltd350 the court concluded the defendant had not succeeded in 
showing that the plaintiff classes’ expert was unreliable.  These cases 
cabined the Daubert inquiry from merits considerations.  Whether this 
distinction can long be maintained given the trend established by Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer351 and the invitation of amended Rule 23 to use the fruits 
of merits-based discovery is an open question.  It is not hard to imagine 
 
 345. Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 129 (footnote omitted). 
 346. See Miller, supra note 324, at 1104 n.623. 
 347. See Steven Glickstein, Melissa C. Morrow, and Julie K. du Pont, Does Daubert Apply to 
Class Certification Hearings?, 695 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 
PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE STRATEGIES 423, 425 (2003). 
 348. 191 F.R.D. 441 (E.D. Pa. 2000). 
 349. Id. at 451-53. 
 350. No. 5:97-CV-159, 2002 WL 32076175 (E.D. Tex. June 16, 2002). 
 351. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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that as more mass tort class actions involving, for instance, defective 
pharmaceuticals, are drawn into the federal system, the very same 
arguments about junk science from Daubert will be mustered to oppose 
class certification, thereby combining summary judgment substitutes–the 
Daubert hearing and the denial of class certification—to curtail the 
litigation altogether. 
D.  Other Benefits 
A more demanding process of class certification, a greater 
probability of achieving summary judgment, and the opportunity to 
exploit summary judgment substitutes are not the only procedural 
features that entice defendants to the federal forum in hopes of ensuring 
victory there.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and important 
decisions construing them provide a global and rich package of 
defendant-oriented devices that frequently displace important state 
policies.  No less an authority than Arthur Miller has warned that federal 
case management under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, the 
adoption of law and economics doctrine by certain federal circuits, and 
standards for judgments as a matter of law, as well as summary 
judgment and Daubert trials, are causing a “rush to judgment” that 
obviates the plaintiff’s right to a day in court and the role of juries.352  In 
the context of the MPMFJA and the CAFA, these concerns play out in a 
more complicated dance whose consequences are even farther removed 
from public scrutiny. 
The strategy of this legislation is to create a Catch-22, or a kind of 
black-hole singularity for state mass torts, especially mass tort class 
actions.  First, state-based claims that never could have been brought 
into the federal forum are redirected there through the device of minimal 
diversity.  Once there, they are subjected to the tender mercies of the 
MDL process and/or the CAFA, and amended Rule 23 as it informs 
both.  In the case of the CAFA the goal is to abort class action 
certification—unless a binding global class settlement is desired—and 
subject plaintiffs to the Hobson’s choice of either proceeding to litigate 
their claims in state court as individual matters, which, given a particular 
plaintiff’s knowledge or other resources may not be likely, or to merely 
“lump it” and cease litigating altogether.  Beyond the effect that 
federalization has on particular proceedings, it has a more problematic 
general one–the chilling effect it will cast on the willingness of lawyers 
 
 352. See Miller, supra note 324, passim. 
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to represent plaintiffs.  The specter of having state-based litigation 
drawn into the federal forum at the defendant’s will and time table, 
where attorney autonomy is curtailed and the defendant-oriented 
principles of class certification, summary judgment, and summary 
judgment substitutes are applied, will inhibit lawyers’ willingness to 
represent plaintiffs in mass class action torts.  It is the goal of CAFA that 
these actions be tied up in the push-pull of the system and that lawyers 
will recognize this.  Meanwhile the ability of states to enforce their own 
policy choices on tort liability will have been limited by a process that 
never was opened to democratic deliberation over the substantive 
changes in law that were at stake. 
V.  SUMMARY—DIVERSITY AND DEMOCRACY REVISITED 
In his 1989 article, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules 
Enabling Act,353 Paul Carrington used a test for “substance,” that 
suggests when a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure might unduly affect 
state law, i.e., whether it provokes the “organized political attention of a 
group of litigants or prospective litigants who (reasonably) claim to be 
specially and adversely affected by the rule.”354  When this test is 
applied not only to the federal rules themselves but to federal procedural 
statutes, it is clear that the CAFA, possibly the MPMFJA, and their 
related procedural assumptions, appendages, and extensions flunk this 
test of political interest.  The proponents of enlarging diversity 
jurisdiction do so for the avowed purpose of changing the substantive 
results of complex litigation emanating from the states.  They are 
organized and political and they represent a group of litigants— 
defendants—who hope to be specially affected by the new procedural 
regime, though positively, not adversely.  What price does ignoring this 
reality extract in terms of democratic values? 
First, it makes a mockery of retaining the states as essential 
building blocks of political community and participation at the local 
level.  If a group of defendants with national power can extend minimal 
diversity to any case they deem “interstate,” there is no principled limit 
to the reach of the federal judiciary.  By spinning the history, purpose, 
and effect of diversity jurisdiction in the constitutional framework, these 
interest groups subtly reorder the structure of the Constitution outside 
 
 353. See Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 281, 308 (1989).  For Carrington’s general account of the significance of 28 U.S.C. § 
2072(b), see id. at 286-89. 
 354. Id. at 308. 
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the purview of the amendment process.  But relocating more complex 
litigation to the federal courts has costs beyond the direct changes in 
federal/state relations.  It erodes key constituents of democratic 
legitimacy, for democracy is not just transported to a different arena 
without residue.  Instead, because the method of affecting substance 
through procedure is technocratic, indirect, and frequently judge-made, 
it retards citizen participation in the value choices the method 
effectuates; it replaces transparency in lawmaking with opacity, and it 
makes political decisionmaking too diffuse to enforce meaningful 
accountability.  What might the quality of policy decisions made through 
these attenuated and indirect methods be? 
Creating a regime of complex litigation designed to crudely reduce 
the amount of money paid by repeat defendants across the board will 
cause negative externalities.  The true social cost of risky behavior will 
not be paid.  What is more important, the opportunity to make difficult 
value choices as to the worth of defendant behavior will be removed 
from local democratic majorities, and it will not be replaced with access 
by national political majorities.  This is because tort law is being 
remodeled by the stealthy method of employing procedural change, not 
by substantive legislation that would be exposed to greater political 
scrutiny and would have to pass the test of valid substantive legislation 
under Article I.  Another way of saying this is that by exploiting the 
judicial power of the national government in diversity cases, proponents 
of tort reform have made it exceedingly difficult for the average citizen 
to identify changes in law that will affect her everyday relations and to 
efficiently mobilize political opposition to them.  For instance, how does 
the normal state citizen understand and oppose something like class 
action certification under amended Rule 23 when they are produced by a 
process as complex and obscure as federal rulemaking? 
It is a truism of federal law that a uniform body of procedural 
principles governing the conduct of the federal courts is highly desirable.  
But, the principle of uniformity is not so sacrosanct that it should 
become the means by which an era of Swift v. Tyson is reinstituted to the 
detriment of democratic values.  The effect of CAFA on state substance 
could be so significant that Congress has gone beyond any legitimate use 
of the Necessary and Proper Clause in conjunction with its power to 
establish the inferior federal courts.355  When minimal diversity is 
deployed for the very purpose of subverting the law of the states, it 
should be rejected as fundamentally incompatible with the structure of 
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the United States Constitution and the democratic principles to which we 
aspire. 
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